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Foreign Relations Federalism in the United States and the 
European Union 
Hierarchy versus pluralism, and the pitfalls of ‘as if’ constitutionalism 
 
Abstract: Taking its cue from the recent rise in antagonism between the European Union 
institutions and Member States, this paper comparatively examines the constitutional 
framework within which the European Union and the United States engage in foreign 
relations. The picture that emerges is one in which hierarchy (US) is contrasted with 
pluralism (EU). This contrast is an invitation for students of EU foreign relations law to 
revisit certain deeply held assumptions, in particular those underlying the constitutional 
paradigm through which EU foreign relations law has been studied in recent decades, both in 
its traditional hierarchical and in its more recent pluralist incarnations. An exploration of the 
US experience points to the limits of what legal argument and litigation can achieve in this 
area; it highlights the importance of structural features of the constitutional framework, such 
as the role of fiscal and military capacities, and points to the need to be mindful, including 
when interpreting the EU Treaties, of the wider geopolitical environment within which the EU 
is required to operate. The paper argues that the EU today is caught in a pluralist 
predicament, between a supranational desire to consolidate, and increased Member State 
resistance against doing so. To escape from this deadlock, increased mutual trust is required. 
The path towards such increased trust is not only legal, but also political; it requires 
sustained political action at both EU and Member State level.     
INTRODUCTION  
2016 has been a tumultuous year for European Union foreign relations.1 Antagonism between 
EU institutions and between EU institutions and Member States has increased; decision-
making paralysis occurs increasingly often.2 Two examples illustrate these difficulties. Early 
                                                
1 EU foreign relations as understood in this paper includes both the former ‘first pillar’, which deals with issues such as 
international trade, environmental policy, development aid, as well as the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). 
Mindful of the interdependence of both ‘pillars’ in articulating and implementing foreign policy, as well as the stated 
objective of the Treaty of Lisbon to integrate both ‘pillars’, a joint treatment is warranted.   
2 In this sense, see e.g. Ricardo Gosalbo-Bono & Frederik Naert, The Reluctant (Lisbon) Treaty and its Implementation in the 
Practice of the Council,  in THE EUROPEAN UNION’S EXTERNAL ACTION IN TIMES OF CRISIS 13–84, 18 (Piet Eeckhout & 
Manual Lopez-Escudero eds., 2016): “Divergent institutional positions on many fronts have resulted in serious inter-
institutional conflicts...” Predicting these difficulties in particular on division of competence issues, see Peter Van 
Elsuwege, The Potential for Inter-Institutional Conflicts before the Court of Justice: Impact of the Lisbon Treaty,  in THE 
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2016, the EU wished to formally conclude an association agreement with Ukraine.3 When the 
Dutch electorate voted down the agreement, the EU failed to deliver on its promise to Ukraine 
to conclude the agreement in a timely fashion.4 Political in Kiev unrest ensued.5 In February 
2017, the Dutch parliament did ratify the agreement6, but only after the heads of state and 
government of the EU Member States agreed to attach an interpretive declaration to the 
agreement, in which they emphasized that the agreement did not open a path towards EU 
membership.7  
In the summer and fall of 2016, a similar controversy arose in the area of international trade. 
For several years, the EU had been in the process of negotiating a Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement with Canada. Throughout the negotiation process, the EU Commission 
had told the Canadian authorities that the final agreement would be concluded as an EU-only 
agreement, to be adopted on the basis of the EU’s exclusive competence to conduct a 
common commercial policy.8 In the summer of 2016, however, the European Commission 
changed course, and – against the advice of its legal service – decided that the agreement was 
                                                                                                                                                   
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 115–136, 135 (Marise 
Cremona & Anne Thies eds., 2014): “Despite all intentions of the Lisbon Treaty reform, inter-institutional conflicts on 
competence delimitation appear unavoidable in the complex legal framework of the EU.” 
3 The agreement had been signed in part on 21 March 2014 and in part on 27 June 2014. See respectively Ukraine crisis: EU 
signs association deal, BBC NEWS, March 21, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26680250 (last visited Apr 6, 
2017). And Europe News.Net - Defying Russian opposition Ukraine signs accord with EU, EUROPE NEWS, 
www.europenews.net/news/223325425/defying-russian-opposition-ukraine-signs-accord-with-eu (last visited Apr 6, 2017). 
4 Netherlands rejects EU-Ukraine partnership deal, BBC NEWS, April 7, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
35976086 (last visited Apr 6, 2017). 
5 David Stern, DUTCH REFERENDUM SHAKES UKRAINE POLITICO (2016), http://www.politico.eu/article/dutch-referendum-
shakes-eu-ukraine-association-agreement-petro-poroshenko/ (last visited Apr 6, 2017). 
6 Rutte krijgt steun Kamer voor zijn “inlegvel” Oekraïne-verdrag, NOS, February 21, 2017, http://nos.nl/artikel/2159402-
rutte-krijgt-steun-kamer-voor-zijn-inlegvel-oekraine-verdrag.html (last visited Apr 6, 2017). 
7 The declaration was attached to the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 15 December 2016, available at 
<http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-34-2016-INIT/en/pdf> accessed 6 April 2017. For an analysis of the 
declaration’s content, see Peter Van Elsuwege, TOWARDS A SOLUTION FOR THE RATIFICATION CONUNDRUM OF THE EU-
UKRAINE ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT? VERFASSUNGSBLOG (2016), http://verfassungsblog.de/towards-a-solution-for-the-
ratification-conundrum-of-the-eu-ukraine-association-agreement/ (last visited Apr 6, 2017). 
8 In this sense, see Armand de Mestral & Markus Gehring, EU should have told Canada years ago it was moving the CETA 
goal posts, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, October 21, 2016, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-
commentary/eu-should-have-told-canada-years-ago-it-was-moving-the-ceta-goal-posts/article32463376/ (last visited Dec 
13, 2016): “Canadians have been surprised to learn that the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA) might not, after seven years of negotiations, be signed on Oct. 27 by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau in Brussels as 
planned.” 
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to be concluded not by the EU alone, but by the 28 Member States as well9; it was to become, 
in other words, a ‘mixed’ agreement.10  
In October 2016, the Council wished to adopt a decision authorizing the signing and 
provisional application of the EU-Canada agreement.11 As the agreement was to be ‘mixed’ in 
nature, it is standing practice within the Council to proceed on a consensual basis, even 
though the EU Treaties provide for decision-making by qualified majority vote. As was 
perhaps to be expected in a framework in which at least 29 parties (28 Member States and the 
EU) need to come to an agreement, collective action problems arose. In particular, the Belgian 
region of Wallonia – a  region with a population of 3 million – refused to authorize the 
Belgian federal authorities to, in turn, authorize the signing and provisional application of the 
EU-Canada agreement.12  
Again, a crisis ensued, leading Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau to wonder: ‘If in a week or 
two we see that Europe is unable to sign a progressive trade agreement with a country like 
Canada, well, then with whom will Europe think that it can do business in the years to 
come?’, adding that if the agreement fails people will ask, ‘what is the point of the EU?’13 
                                                
9 Gehring and de Mestral have suggested that the European Commission’s change of tactics was caused also by the ruling by 
the German Bundesverfassungsgericht in which the Court suggested that Germany’s consent to CETA Germany’s consent 
would be on a provisional basis only, subject to a right to rescind and that the decision in the Council of the European 
Union be unanimous. See Id. And also Urteil vom 13. Oktober 2016 2 BvR 1368/16, 2 BvE 3/16, 2 BvR 1823/16, 2 BvR 
1482/16, 2 BvR 1444/16, available at 
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2016/10/rs20161013_2bvr136816.html;jsession
id=35DF5C09520378E1D3622FD498F952E8.1_cid361 accessed 6 April 2017. 
10 ‘Mixed agreements’ are agreement to which not only the EU, but also some or – in most instances –  all EU Member States 
are a party. Mixed agreements have been a feature of EU foreign relations since its inception. The 1961 association 
agreement with Greece, for example, was concluded as a mixed agreement. On mixed agreements, see MIXED AGREEMENTS 
REVISITED: THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES IN THE WORLD, (Christophe Hillion & Panos Koutrakos eds., 2010). Mixed 
agreements have often been understood as an inevitable but undesirable element of EU treaty-making. In this sense, see e.g. 
C.-D. Ehlermann, Mixed Agreements - A Set of Problems,  in MIXED AGREEMENTS (David O’Keeffe & Henry G. Schermers 
eds., 1983). For a defense of the practice, see Joseph Weiler, The External Legal Relations of Non-unitary Actors: Mixity 
and the Federal Principle,  in THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE : ESSAYS ON THE ENDS AND MEANS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. 
130 (1999). 
11 See the Proposal for a Council decision on the signing on behalf of the European Union of the Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement between Canada of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part, 
COM(2016) 444 final, 5.7.2016. 
12 Belgian province may sink EU-Canada trade deal, BBC NEWS, October 11, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-
canada-37603878 (last visited Apr 6, 2017). It should be noted that pursuant to Article 167 of the Belgian Constitution, 
Belgian regions and communities possess treaty-making powers on issues over which they have been allocated internal 
powers. On this peculiar feature of Belgian federalism, see e.g. Jan Velaers, “In foro interno et in foro externo”: de 
internationale bevoegdheden van gemeenschappen en gewesten,  in INTERNATIONALE BETREKKINGEN EN FEDERALISME: 
STAATSRECHTCONFERENTIE 2005 - VLAAMSE JURISTENVERENIGING 3–86 (Godfried Geudens & Frank Judo eds., 2006). 
13 Tim Wallace, Canada walks out of EU trade talks declaring a deal “impossible” and Brussels “incapable,” THE 
TELEGRAPH, October 21, 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/10/21/canada-walks-out-of-eu-trade-talks-
declaring-a-deal-impossible-a/ (last visited Mar 25, 2017). 
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After last-minute negotiations between not only the Walloon and Belgian federal authorities, 
but also the European Commission and Canada’s international trade minister Chrystia 
Freeland, an agreement was reached.14 In exchange for Wallonia’s agreement, the Belgian 
government committed inter alia to bringing before the European Court of Justice a request 
for an opinion on the legality of the proposed dispute settlement mechanism included in the 
EU-Canada agreement.15 
Political considerations in part explain Mr Trudeau’s comments on the ‘point of the EU.’ Like 
his trade minister, who in dramatic fashion returned to Canada when the talks broke down16, 
Mr Trudeau had an interest in putting pressure on the EU. Questioning the EU’s credibility as 
an international actor is a safe way to achieve this aim.17 Despite these political motivations, it 
is nonetheless worth taking Mr Trudeau’s remarks seriously. The Canadian and Ukrainian 
controversies are symptomatic of the difficulties the EU experiences in making decisions. 
This is the case in particular in the sphere of foreign relations – an area in which Member 
States, it is often said, are adamant to ‘remain visible on the international stage’, and because 
of this insist on making use of the ‘mixity’ formula.18 
In the final analysis, the Ukrainian and Canadian controversies revolve around a question the 
EU is not the first to confront. Historically, other compound polities have faced similar 
questions on the appropriate balance between unity and diversity on the international stage. 
How much diversity ought a compound polity project onto the international stage? Or ought 
                                                
14 Jennifer Rankin, Belgian politicians drop opposition to EU-Canada trade deal, THE GUARDIAN, October 27, 2016, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/27/belgium-reaches-deal-with-wallonia-over-eu-canada-trade-agreement (last 
visited Apr 6, 2017). 
15 The intra-Belgian compromise is available here: 
http://www.lesoir.be/sites/default/files/1965727419_B9710082943Z.1_20161027164004_000_G0D7SMUCH.1-0.pdf 
accessed 6 April 2017.  
16 On Mrs Freeland’s dramatic exit, see Aaron Wherry, “The tactic has paid off:” Freeland’s dramatic walk out didn’t 
imperil CETA after all, CBC NEWS, October 28, 2017, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/wherry-freeland-ceta-1.3824374 
(last visited Apr 6, 2017). 
17 ‘Credibility’, Joseph Nye argues, ‘is … an important resource of soft power. Reputation becomes even more important 
than in the past, and political struggles occur over the creation and destruction of credibility.’ See JOSEPH S. NYE, THE 
FUTURE OF POWER 103–104 (2011). 
18 See e.g., in the context of the EU participation in international organizations, Ramses A. Wessel, The Legal Framework for 
the Participation of the European Union in International Institutions, 33 JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 621–635, 
624 (2011), referring to the “general preference of member states to remain present and visible themselves in international 
institutions.” Similarly, see Opinion of AG Kokott in Commission v Council (‘Conditional Access’), C-137/12, para. 34, 
where the Advocate General summarized the Commission’s argument before the Court as presuming that through its action 
the Council had intended artificially to create a mixed agreement in order to allow the Member States an international 
presence alongside the European Union.  
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the diversity that characterizes compound polities in the domestic sphere stop at the water’s 
edge?19 In the United States, in particular, discussions of this type played an important role in 
the process leading up to the ratification of the 1789 Constitution. In the Federalist Papers, 
the question of America’s ability to tackle foreign interference in its domestic politics played 
a central role in the arguments advanced by John Jay and James Madison, leading the latter at 
one point to exclaim that ‘if the United States were to be one nation in any respect, it clearly 
ought to be in respect to other nations.’20 
Mindful of the fact that the EU is less unique than it is sometimes portrayed to be21, this paper 
explores the constitutional balance between the EU and its Member States in the sphere of 
foreign relations. It does so, in particular, against the backdrop of the US experience.22 By 
comparing the EU ‘foreign affairs constitution’ in this area with its US counterpart, this paper 
pursues a twofold aim. First, it contributes to fostering a greater understanding and knowledge 
amongst European audiences of the US experience in the area of foreign relations. By 
exploring how a functionally similar issue (i.e. the issue of striking an appropriate balance 
between unity and diversity in the sphere of foreign relations) has been addressed in the 
United States, students and practitioners of EU foreign relations law are invited to question 
                                                
19 This question harks back to the broader question of whether it is appropriate to extend domestic constitutional principles to 
the external realm. The breaking down of the distinction between the domestic and the external in recent decades has 
brought this question to the forefront both in Europe and the United States. In the EU context, see e.g. PIET EECKHOUT, 
DOES EUROPE’S CONSTITUTION STOP AT THE WATER’S EDGE? : LAW AND POLICY IN THE EU’S EXTERNAL RELATIONS (2005), 
arguing that in light of the breakdown of the internal-external distinction it is necessary to apply domestic constitutional 
principles as much as possible to external issues. In the US, the debate on the ‘normalization’ of foreign relations law can 
be understood as fitting in this context as well. See Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign 
Relations Law, 128 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 1897–2098 (2015), identifying globalization as one of the causal factors behind 
the “normalization” of foreign relations law. 
20 GEORGE W. CAREY, THE FEDERALIST (THE GIDEON EDITION), EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTION, READER’S GUIDE, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CROSS-REFERENCE, INDEX, AND GLOSSARY BY GEORGE W. CAREY AND JAMES MCCLELLAN No 42 (2001). 
21 The EU is often portrayed as a sui generis polity. For examples, see the references in Robert Schütze, On “federal” 
ground : the European Union as an (inter)national phenomenon., 46 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 1069–1105, 1091 
(2009). For a characterization of the EU as a federal-type polity, see e.g. Schütze, supra note. In the same sense, see Daniel 
Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Role of the Judiciary,  in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 
142–164, 142 (2008), defining federalism as “the coexistence within a compound polity of multiple levels of government 
each with constitutionally grounded claims to some degree of organizational autonomy and jurisdictional authority.” On the 
EU as a federal-type polity and on federalism in Europe more generally, see ELKE CLOOTS, GEERT DE BAERE & STEFAN 
SOTTIAUX, FEDERALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2012).  
22 In doing so, the paper builds on earlier work in this comparative tradition. See seminally E. Stein & L. Henkin, Towards a 
European Polity? The European Foreign Affairs System from the Perspective of the United States Constitution, I-3 in 
INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW 3–82 (M. Cappelletti, M. Seccombe, & J. Weiler eds., 1986). More recently, see also Robert 
Schütze, Federalism and Foreign Affairs. Mixity as a (inter)national phenomenon,  in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE EU 
CONSTITUTION: SELECTED ESSAYS 175–208 (2014); Geert De Baere & Kathleen Gutman, Federalism and International 
Relations in the European Union and the United States: A Comparative Outlook,  in FEDERALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
131–166 (Elke Cloots, Geert De Baere, & Stefan Sottiaux eds., 2012). 
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the existing constitutional framework in the EU23 – a framework, which, due to a misguided 
yet persistent belief in the sui generis nature of the EU, is often considered to be the only 
possible way for the EU to engage in foreign relations.24 
Second, the paper makes a first step towards critically re-examining the intellectual 
framework within which analyses of the EU constitutional framework are undertaken. Against 
the backdrop of the US experience, and drawing on the literature on constitutional pluralism, 
the paper characterizes the gap between constitutional principle as articulated by the ECJ on 
the one hand and Council institutional practice on the other hand as a manifestation of 
systemic pluralism. Contra the normative orientation of much of the literature on pluralism in 
the judicial setting, however, this ‘pluralist predicament’, the paper suggests, is not 
sustainable and therefore not desirable, at least not in the context of foreign relations. For 
foreign relations, in particular in an increasingly hostile international environment, has a zero-
sum character: in the final analysis, the paper demonstrates, diversity – as reflected in the 
Council’s practice of mixity – prevails, and little room for unity remains available, leading to 
difficulties of the type described in the above.  
This observation raises a fundamental question for the constitutionalism paradigm, both in its 
hierarchical and pluralist manifestations – a paradigm which, at least as a practical matter, 
continues to dominate EU legal discourse, both amongst academic commentators and 
practitioners.25 Ought the legal argument in favor of further unity be pressed further, if 
                                                
23 The epistemic community that produces legal discourse on EU foreign relations law is small, consisting mainly of 
practitioners within the EU institutions – in particular the legal services of the Commission, Council, Parliament and the 
ECJ – as well as a number of commentators with close ties to those institutions. Genuine comparative work is not often 
performed by members of this community, perhaps because the direct practical relevance of such work is not always 
immediately apparent. This is not to suggest, however, that no comparative work is done at all. See e.g. ROBERT SCHÜTZE, 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE EU CONSTITUTION: SELECTED ESSAYS (2014), drawing heavily from the US experience.  
24 In this sense, the exploration of the US experience serves to create a space for critical analysis of the EU foreign affairs 
constitution. As Günter Frankenberg argued: ‘Distance is needed to gain a vantage on who we are and what we are doing 
and thinking. Distancing can be described as an attempt to break away from firmly held beliefs and settled knowledge and 
as an attempt to resist the power of prejudice and ignorance. From a distance old knowledge can be reviewed and new 
knowledge can be distinguished as it is in its own right. Distance de-centers our world-view and thus establishes what might 
be called objectivity.’ See Günter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-Thinking Comparative Law, 26 HARVARD 
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 411–457, 414 (1985). On the value of identifying ‘false necessities’, see also, from a 
pragmatic perspective, as opposed to Frankenberg’s critical viewpoint: Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative 
Constitutional Law, 108 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL 1225, 1227 (1999): “Comparative study is sometimes said to allow a 
person embedded in one system to gain some distance from it. Having become intellectually estranged from that system, 
one can then see that seemingly unchangeable arrangements actually might be altered without substantial loss and 
sometimes with substantial gain. Familiar arrangements seem necessary to us, but comparative study demonstrates that they 
might be false necessities.”  
25 For a seminal articulation of the constitutional paradigm, see Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a 
Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 1–27 (1981).  
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necessary by means of litigation before the ECJ? Again, an exploration of the US experience 
in this area points to the limits of what legal argument can achieve. Required, the paper 
suggests, is increased mutual trust. Only in the presence of mutual trust will constitutional 
changes, for example the establishment of independent fiscal and military capacities for the 
EU, become a possibility. For such trust to emerge, however, what is needed is sustained 
political action, both at national and EU level. At the national level, Europeans must hold 
their representatives in the Council accountable, and urge them to act in accordance with the 
common EU interest. At the EU level, political action is required to open up the Council 
‘black box.’ For only through increased transparency will meaningful accountability become 
a possibility.  
The paper develops this argument in three parts. A first part explores the federal-state 
relationship in the US. A second part undertakes a similar inquiry into the EU-Member State 
relationship against the backdrop of the US experience. A third part engages in the 
abovementioned reflection on the sustainability and desirability of Europe’s pluralist 
predicament.  
FEDERALISM AND FOREIGN RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: PRAGMATIC 
TOLERANCE WITHIN A HIERARCHICAL FRAMEWORK 
What is the structure of the federal relationship in the US? The text of the Constitution is not 
entirely conclusive: the framers have delegated some powers to Congress and the President, 
and have prohibited the states from engaging in certain activities that could affect the nation’s 
foreign relations.26 From the outset, however, the Constitution has been interpreted as placing 
the federal government at the steering wheel of foreign policy-making in the US.27  
                                                
26 See in particular Article I §8 Cl 3 (Congressional power to regulate foreign commerce), Cl 10 (Congressional power to 
define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas and offences against the law of nations), Cl 11 
(Congressional power to declare war), Cl 12 (Congressional power to raise and to support armies), Cl 14 (Congressional 
power to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces), Cl 18 (Congressional power to adopt 
laws ‘necessary and proper or carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof’; Article II §1 Cl 1 
(Presidential executive power), §2 Cl 1 (Presidential Commander in Chief power), Cl 2 (Presidential treaty-making power, 
with advice and consent by the Senate, and power to nominate and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate 
appoint ambassadors and consuls). Article I §10 prohibits the states from engaging in a number of activities, including 
entering into treaties, alliances or confederations, or to enter into agreements or compacts with foreign powers without 
Congressional approval. 
27 In this sense, see e.g. David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Civilized Nation: The Early American Constitution, the 
Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, A, 85 NYUL REV. 932, 989 (2010): “Considered as a whole, 
and understood in historical perspective, the text establishes a comprehensive regime for dealing with foreign affairs with 
an eye equally on centralizing all of the relevant powers in the federal government and on ensuring, as far as possible, that 
the federal government would uphold the nation”s international duties’. 
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This section describes the ways in which the supremacy of the federal government in this area 
has been ensured.28 For a long stretch of time, ‘foreign relations’ was understood as a distinct 
policy area, which in its entirety had been delegated to the federal government. Within this 
paradigm, the states were categorically precluded from engaging in activities that could be 
understood as affecting the effectiveness of the federal government’s foreign policy. This 
categorical approach will be unpacked further in a first section.  
In the second half of the twentieth century, a gradual shift has taken place whereby in 
Supreme Court case law categorical language was replaced with a language of balancing and 
a preference for settling disputes between the federal government and states by applying 
preemption principles. This shift towards a preemption paradigm will be explored in section 
two. The section will explain how, despite the turn to preemption, through a reliance on 
functionalist arguments, the ‘just supremacy’ of the federal government in the area of foreign 
relations nonetheless remains protected. The overall image that emerges from this analysis, 
therefore, is one in which the US federal government is fully in control over US foreign 
relations. States are able to engage in foreign relations, but they do so at the mercy of the 
federal government. In short: the US constitutional framework is characterized by a pragmatic 
tolerance towards state foreign relations within a constitutional framework which is 
hierarchical in nature.  
The categorical paradigm: foreign relations as an exclusively federal area of law- and policy-
making 
In the early decades of the American Republic, courts were adamant on protecting the 
position of the young federal government as the only representative of the United States on 
the international stage.29 The 1840 case of Holmes v Jennison is a first illustration of this early 
                                                
28 As US states – unlike EU Member States – are precluded in general terms from making treaties (see Article I §10 Cl 1 of 
the Constitution), federalism issues emerge in the US context in less visible ways. Litigation in this area typically pits the 
federal government against an individual state, which has enacted a statute that the federal government understands as 
affecting and potentially conflicting federal foreign policy. This paper does not address the issue of potential federalism 
restrictions on the scope of the federal government’s treaty making power. In an era in which the federal government’s 
domestic legislative authority is very broad, the issue of possible restrictions on the federal government’s external powers is 
not salient in practical terms. On this subject, see e.g. E. T Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 403–533 (2003), arguing that “federalism does not constrain the treaty power, when the 
Constitution is read as an organic whole and interpreted in a fashion in keeping both with international law and the New 
Federalism itself.” It is noteworthy that in the Supreme Court case of Bond v United States, only Justice Thomas subscribed 
to the view that federalism limits the scope of the treaty-making power, and that only Justice Thomas and Scalia subscribed 
to the view that the power to implement treaties is not broader than Congress’ Article I legislative powers. See Bond v 
United States, 572 U. S. ____ (2014). 
29 Golove and Hulsebosch, supra note 27 at 989. 
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approach.30 When asked to rule on the constitutionality of a decision by the governor of 
Vermont to extradite a Mr Holmes to the Canadian authorities, the Supreme Court ruled that 
‘any intercourse between a state and a foreign nation was dangerous to the Union; that it 
would open a door of which foreign powers would avail themselves to obtain influence in 
separate states’, and that ‘[p]rovisions were therefore introduced to cut off all negotiations and 
intercourse between the state authorities and foreign nations.’31 In this case, foreign relations 
were understood broadly, as encompassing all contacts with foreign powers, including on 
issues with little political salience. The authority to engage in such contacts, the argument ran, 
had been delegated exclusively to the federal government.  
A similar approach could be seen at work in the 1889 Chinese Exclusion case, a case which 
did not directly raise federalism questions, but in which the Supreme Court nonetheless was 
adamant to emphasize the central role of the federal government in conducting the nation’s 
foreign relations.32 Mr Chan Chae Ping, a lawful US resident, was barred entry to the US 
when returning from a visit to China. During his absence, Congress had adopted the 1888 
Scott Act. This Act overturned elements of a US-Chinese treaty on the basis of which Mr 
Chan Chae Ping had previously obtained a US visa. The Supreme Court confirmed the 
constitutionality of the Scott Act. It did so on the basis of the argument that the Constitution 
had delegated to the federal government all powers typically associated with sovereign 
statehood. The Supreme Court, Justice Field, held that ‘the United States, in their relation to 
foreign countries and their subjects or citizens, are one nation, invested with powers which 
belong to independent nations, the exercise of which can be invoked for the maintenance of 
its absolute independence and security throughout its entire territory.’33  
The categorical approach to foreign relations according to which it was conceptually 
inconceivable for US states to engage in foreign relations was articulated most forcefully by 
Justice Sutherland in the 1937 cases of Curtiss-Wright and Belmont.34 In Curtiss-Wright, the 
                                                
30 39 U.S. 540 (1840). 
31 Ibid, 573-574. 
32 Chae Chan Ping v. U.S. (‘Chinese Exclusion Case’), 130 U.S. 581 (1889).  
33 Ibid, 604. At issue in Chinese Exclusion was also the question of whether an Act of Congress can override a treaty. The 
question arose because the Supreme Clause characterises both types of norms as the ‘supreme law of the land.’ The Court 
here introduced the ‘later-in-time’ rule, according to which the later norm controls.  
34 U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304 (1936) and U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). The theory 
Justice Sutherland articulated in these cases he had defended in earlier scholarly writings. See in particular GEORGE 
SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND WORLD AFFAIRS (First edition 1919 ed. 2013). 
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Supreme Court was invited to rule on the legality and constitutionality of a decision by the 
President to prohibit arms sales to Columbia. A number of arms exporters questioned the 
legality of the President’s decision by arguing the President had overstepped the boundaries of 
the powers Congress had delegated to him by means of a resolution.  
Even though the dispute could be resolved without reaching the constitutional question of the 
scope and nature of the President’s (and by extension the federal government’s) powers over 
foreign relations, Justice Sutherland in Curtiss-Wright articulated a theory of Presidential 
authority that potentially left no room at all for other actors – Congress and a fortiori the 
states – to engage in activities that could affect the nation’s foreign relations. In Sutherland’s 
view, all powers pertaining to foreign relations had been transferred from the British Crown 
directly to the federal government, to which ‘external sovereignty’ had passed when the US 
had acquired independence from the United Kingdom.35 It followed, Sutherland argued, that 
the 1789 Constitution could not delegate powers over foreign relations to the federal 
government, as the states and the people had nothing to delegate in the first place. 
In addition, Justice Sutherland advanced functionalist arguments to justify the President’s 
central role in foreign policy-making.36 He held: 
It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment—
perhaps serious embarrassment—is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved, 
congressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within 
the international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom 
from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved. 
Moreover, he, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which 
prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential 
sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other 
                                                
35 U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304 (1936), 318: ‘[T]he investment of the federal government with 
the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution. The powers to declare 
and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had 
never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of 
nationality.’ 
36 ‘Functionalism’ is an approach to constitutional interpretation driven by a desire to ensure that the institutions the 
constitution establishes are practically able to fulfil the functions for which they were established. Functionalist reasoning, 
in this sense, is consequentialist: it focusses on the effects of a decision and whether or not these effects are desirable. On 
consequentialism as a method of interpretation, see LACKLAND H. BLOOM (JR.), METHODS OF INTERPRETATION: HOW THE 
SUPREME COURT READS THE CONSTITUTION ch 10 (2009). 
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officials. Secrecy in respect of information gathered by them may be highly necessary, and the 
premature disclosure of it productive of harmful results.37 
In the case of Belmont, which came before the Supreme Court shortly after Curtiss-Wright, 
the Supreme Court, again Justice Sutherland, expressed more directly what this extra-
constitutional theory of federal authority over foreign relations implied for the federal-state 
relationship.38 The case involved a challenge by the federal government against the estate of a 
deceased Mr Belmont, a banker, who had refused to transfer to the federal government assets 
which were owned previously by Russian entities and which, as provided for in a US-Soviet 
agreement, were to become property of the United States. The transfer, the Belmont estate 
argued, violated New York State public policy. Justice Sutherland, writing for the majority, 
considered this factor irrelevant. He did not consider it necessary to examine whether release 
of the funds violated New York public policy, since the matter pertained to the United States’ 
foreign relations – the release of the sums falling within the scope of the agreement between 
the US and Soviet authorities. ‘Governmental power over internal affairs’, Justice Sutherland 
argued, ‘is distributed between the national government and the several states. Governmental 
power over external affairs is not distributed, but is vested exclusively in the national 
government.’39 And he continued:  
In respect of all international negotiations and compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations 
generally, state lines disappear. As to such purposes the state of New York does not exist. 
Within the field of its powers, whatever the United States right-fully undertakes, it necessarily 
has warrant to consummate. And when judicial authority is invoked in aid of such 
consummation, State Constitutions, state laws, and state policies are irrelevant to the inquiry 
and decision. It is inconceivable that any of them can be interposed as an obstacle to the 
effective operation of a federal constitutional power.40  
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and ordered the Belmont estate 
to release the sums to the  US authorities. As in Holmes and Chinese Exclusion, the Curtiss-
Wright and Belmont Courts approached the federal-state relationship in the sphere of foreign 
relations in categorical terms. The approach relied on a clear-cut separation between domestic 
                                                
37 Ibid, 320. 
38 U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). 
39 Ibid, 330-331. 
40 Ibid., 331. 
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and international affairs, whereby only the federal government was understood as playing a 
role in foreign relations.  
The preemption paradigm: preemption, but with functional undertones 
In the second half of the 20th century, the categorical paradigm gradually made way for a 
paradigm within which it is no longer accepted as an article of faith that US states are 
categorically precluded from engaging in activities that could affect the nation’s foreign 
relations. This shift arguably created a constitutional space within which US states can engage 
in activities that touch on the nation’s foreign relations. It became conceivable, for example, 
for states to conclude non-binding agreements with third country governments41, or to 
undertake joint initiatives, as they have done e.g. in the area of environmental protection.42  
However, this shift in methodology should not be understood as a fundamental shift in the 
structure of the relationship between the federal and state governments. As will be explained 
below, at a structural level, the supremacy of the federal government in the sphere of foreign 
relations remains protected: by including functionalist factors in the preemption analysis, 
courts aim to ensure the full effectiveness of federal foreign policy. 
A first crack in the categorical paradigm could be observed in the 1968 case of Zschernig.43 
Zschernig involved a challenge against an Oregon statute which made dependent the 
possibility for aliens to inherit Oregon-based property on the existence of reciprocity in the 
aliens’ home jurisdiction. Since a measure of this type invited US courts to make 
determinations of the degree in which the rule of law was respected in foreign countries, the 
Supreme Court, Justice Douglas, considered the Oregon statute to be in violation of the 
federal government’s authority over foreign relations.  
                                                
41 On this practice, see generally Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, 88 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 741 (2009). 
Hollis describes how, through an application by analogy of Supreme Court case law on the constitutionality of interstate 
compacts, a category of compacts between state and foreign governments became understood as not falling within the scope 
of the Foreign Compact Clause (Article I §2 Cl 3 of the US Constitution: ‘No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, 
lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with 
another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not 
admit of delay’). 
42 For an overview of state international activities, see MICHAEL J. GLENNON & ROBERT D. SLOANE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
FEDERALISM: THE MYTH OF NATIONAL EXCLUSIVITY ch 2 (2016). This phenomenon fits within a broader pattern. For a 
comparative overview, see e.g. DAVID CRIEKEMANS, REGIONAL SUB-STATE DIPLOMACY TODAY (2010).  
43 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 
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Zschernig is typically remembered as a ruling in which the Supreme Court endorsed a 
particularly broad reading of the federal government’s authority in the sphere of foreign 
relations.44 At closer inspection, however, the ruling diverges from the categorical paradigm 
defended a few decades earlier in Curtiss-Wright and Belmont. In particular, Zschernig 
diverged from Sutherland’s theory through the weight the Court gave to the practical effects 
of the application of the Oregon statute. In particular, Justice Douglas suggested that the 
statute infringed on the federal government’s authority over foreign relations precisely 
because it invited state judges to engage in political assessments of the degree in which 
foreign regimes aligned with American values of democracy and the rule of law.45 The 
reliance on the practical application of the Oregon statute arguably distinguishes Zschernig 
from earlier case law, in particular Curtiss-Wright and Belmont. In this sense, the case can be 
understood as a first step towards the preemption paradigm that fully emerged at the end of 
the 20th century.  
In its more recent case law on the subject of federalism in the sphere of foreign relations, the 
Supreme Court resolves conflicts between the federal government and state governments 
through an application of preemption principles. Before proceeding further, it is useful to 
briefly explore what is understood in US constitutional law by the notion of ‘preemption.’ 
‘Preemption’ refers to the displacement of state law by federal law by virtue of the Supremacy 
Clause. The Supremacy Clause provides: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; 
and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall 
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.  
                                                
44 Zschernig is known, in particular, for introducing a ‘dormant’ form of ‘foreign affairs preemption.’ On this doctrine, see 
e.g. Matthew Schafer, Constraints on State-Level Foreign Policy: (Re) Justifying, Refining and Distinguishing the Dormant 
Foreign Affairs Doctrine, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 201 (2011). Schafer understands Zschernig and the foreign affairs 
preemption doctrine it introduces as rooted in an understanding of the federal government’s foreign affairs powers as being 
exclusive in nature. See Id. at 204.: “The dormant foreign affairs doctrine is rooted in an exclusive federal government 
foreign affairs power. By definition, if a power is exclusive to the federal government, then states are denied such power 
irrespective of whether the federal government has utilized its power.” 
45 Justice Douglas referred to judgments by Oregon courts as ‘radiat[ing] some of the attitudes of the ‘cold war,’ where the 
search is for the ‘democracy quotient’ of a foreign regime as opposed to the Marxist theory. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 
U.S. 429 (1968), 435. In its emphasis on the application of the Oregon statute, Douglas distinguished Zschernig from the 
earlier case of Clark v Allen, in which the Supreme Court had upheld a statute which facially resembled the Oregon statute 
at issue in Zschernig, but which, crucially, did not invite courts to embark in similar types of inquiries. See Clark v. Allen, 
331 U.S. 503 (1947). 
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The text of the Supremacy Clause appears to suggest that state law can only be struck down 
on preemption grounds if it conflicts with one of the reference norms included in the Clause, 
i.e. the Constitution, federal statutes and, hypothetically, treaties.46 The question of when 
exactly the Supremacy Clause requires a state norm to be invalidated is highly fact-
dependent.47 To facilitate the inquiry, Congress can include in a federal statute an express 
preemption provision, in which it provides state authorities guidance on how to avoid 
preemption and courts on how to resolve conflicts. In the absence of such a provision, state 
norms will be invalidated in the event of a genuine conflict (i.e. when a simultaneous 
application of both norms is physically impossible), if the state norm is an obstacle to the 
application of the federal law, or when Congress, by adopting a statute or a statutory scheme, 
has indicated a willingness to ‘occupy the field.’48  
The 1999 case of Crosby provides a first example of a judgment in which the Supreme Court 
applied preemption principles to a case involving foreign relations.49 Crosby involved a 
Massachusetts statute which prohibited government agencies from buying goods or services 
from companies that conducted business in Burma (Myanmar). Under the categorical 
paradigm, the Massachusetts statute arguably could have been struck down as an infringement 
on the federal government’s exclusive powers over foreign relations. Justice Souter 
nonetheless took a different course, and invalidated the statute on the grounds that it 
represented an obstacle to the effectiveness of a federal statute by which Congress had 
introduced similar sanctions against Burma.  
Crosby has been praised by commentators.50 It has been understood, in particular, as carving 
out a space for individual states to engage in foreign relations alongside the federal 
                                                
46 For treaties to benefit from the conflict rule set out in the Supremacy Clause, they must be recognized as being ‘self-
executing.’ In particular since the Supreme Court ruling in Medellin v Texas (552 U. S. ____ (2008)), this has become an 
increasingly rare occurrence.  
47 In this sense, see Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts 
Court, 2011 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW 253–344, 255 (2012): “Congress”s pre-emptive intent ... varies by context, and 
courts faithful to interpreting that intent will thus produce varying results from one context to another’. 
48 For a useful summary of preemption doctrine, see Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Arizona v US, 567 U.S. ___ (2012), pp 7-8. 
See also generally WILLIAM W. BUZBEE, PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE 
QUESTION (2008). 
49 Crosby et al. v National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U. S. 363 (2000). 
50 See in particular Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW 1223 e.s. 
(1999). Daniel Halberstam has suggested that Crosby, even if it does not expressly endorse the possibility of State 
international action, can nonetheless be read as tolerant towards such action. See Daniel Halberstam, The Foreign Affairs of 
Federal Systems: a National Perspective on the Benefits of State Participation,  VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW 1015–1068 
(2001). 
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government. Such an approach, they argued, was more in tandem with contemporary realities 
of a globalized international environment.51  
However, the impact of Crosby should not be overstated. In subsequent and – perhaps not 
coincidentally also post-9/11 – case law, the Supreme Court did reaffirm its approach of 
applying preemption principles to cases touching on the nation’s foreign relations, but it did 
so in a manner that leaves little chance for state governments to prevail over the federal 
government. In particular, through a reliance on functionalist considerations, the Supreme 
Court can be understood as ensuring that when contested, state law cannot undermine the 
effectiveness of federal foreign policy.52  
In the Supreme Court’s more recent case law involving the federal-state relationship, 
functional considerations of this type undeniably played a role. In the majority opinion in the 
2003 case of Garamendi, for example, Justice Souter relied on the ability of a California 
statute to ‘interfere with the President’s conduct of the Nation’s foreign policy’ to conclude in 
favor of a California statute’s unconstitutionality.53 He considered, in particular, that the 
California statute ‘compromise[d] the very capacity of the President to speak for the Nation 
with one voice in dealing with other governments.’54 Similarly, in the case of Arizona v 
United States, on the constitutionality of Arizona statutory provisions on the subject of 
immigration, Justice Kennedy argued in favor of striking down one aspect of the statute 
because he considered it ‘fundamental that foreign countries concerned about the status, 
safety, and security of their nationals in the United States must be able to confer and 
communicate on this subject with one national sovereign, not the 50 separate states.’55 
The picture that emerges from an analysis of Garamendi and Arizona is perhaps best captured 
by Kerry Abrams, who used the metaphor of a scale to refer to the Supreme Court’s approach 
                                                
51 This is particularly visible in Spiro’s work, who has relied on globalization as requiring an overhaul of the foreign relations 
constitutional framework aimed at extending domestic constitutional principles to the external sphere.  See Peter J. Spiro, 
Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649–730, 649 (2002), arguing that “[i]n so far as 
these elements of globalization lower the risk of catastrophic interstate conflict and take account of actors outside of the 
traditional diplomatic apparatus, differential foreign relations doctrines departing from baseline norms of judicial review, 
federalism, and individual rights are appropriately contested.” 
 
53 American Insurance Association v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
54 Ibid, 424. 
55 Ibid. 
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to preemption in foreign relations cases.56 In contrast to Curtiss-Wright, the Supreme Court 
approaches federalism questions in the sphere of foreign relations no longer in straightforward 
categorical terms. Rather, the Court makes an assessment of the relevant factors, placing 
weights on both sides of the scale, and waiting to see where the scale would find its 
equilibrium.57 The federal-state relationship no is longer a black-or-white matter (if it ever 
was); the states and the federal government often operate within a single sphere of concurrent 
powers. However, Abrams added, functionalist arguments of the type referred to in the above 
operate as if a very heavy thumb has been placed on the federal government’s side of the 
scale, making it quite unlikely for the scale to find its equilibrium on the side of the state.  
Where does this leave the states? Could it be argued that the Supreme Court, through its use 
of functionalist arguments, has revived Curtiss-Wright through the backdoor and, in doing so, 
has kept the door shut for states to engage in foreign relations, be it directly (through contacts 
with foreign governments) or indirectly (through legislation affecting foreign governments)?58 
The answer must be nuanced. On the one hand, it is difficult to see how the autonomy of 
individual states can be sustained within a functionalist framework according to which the 
need to act effectively on the international stage is regarded as an important value worthy of 
judicial protection. In a related context, Justice Scalia referred to this risk, where he held that  
[f]unctionalism of the sort the Court practices today will systematically favor the unitary 
President over the plural Congress in disputes involving foreign affairs. It is possible that this 
approach will make for more effective foreign policy, perhaps as effective as that of a 
                                                
56 Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601, 603 (2013). The scale metaphor is often used to refer to 
judicial practices of balancing. See e.g. Louis Henkin, Infallibility under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78 COLUMBIA LAW 
REVIEW 1022–1049, 1049 (1978): “[T]the Court has to begin to define and refine the weights it puts into balance, which 
rights have special weight, which needs are particularly compelling, so we can see that the scales are not being held blindly, 
irrationally.” On balancing more generally, see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 
96 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL 943–1005 (1987). For a critical comparison of the US and German approaches to balancing, 
see JACCO BOMHOFF, BALANCING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: THE ORIGINS AND MEANINGS OF POSTWAR LEGAL DISCOURSE 
(2013). 
57 The balancing approach was perhaps most visibly at work in Justice Souter’s opinion in Garamendi, where he expressly 
weighed the federal government’s interests against those of the state of California. In this calculation, the national interest in 
seeing the federal government’s foreign policy safeguarded trumped the interests of the state of California, Souter 
considered – interests which in any case collided, as both California and the federal government ultimately strived to see 
Holocaust victims compensated for their suffering. See American Insurance Association v Garamendi, 539 US 396 (2003), 
420-427. 
58 Ernest Young made an argument of this type when he argued that in the sphere of foreign relations, dual federalism is still 
alive. See Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 THE GEORGE 
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 139 (2001). 
 17 
monarchy. It is certain that, in the long run, it will erode the structure of separated powers that 
the People established for the protection of their liberty.59 
The argument is valid with regard to the federal-state relationship as well. Functionalism 
structurally favors the federal government over the states; it is not clear, as a matter of 
constitutional interpretation, what space remains for the states to engage in relations with 
foreign powers.  
On the other hand, however, it is important to be mindful of the fact that the framework 
within which the Court undertakes its analysis nonetheless is one within which state action is 
authorized in principle, and in which restrictions on this authorization must be justified, either 
on Supremacy Clause or other grounds.60 Abstraction made of the Constitution’s explicit 
restrictions on state foreign policy, it is fair to say that only in rare events will Congress (by 
means of an express preemption provision) or the courts strike down a state law that touches 
on foreign relations. In any case, litigation would appear to be required to prevent states from 
engaging in activities the federal government considers unconstitutional.61  
Louis Henkin summarized the US approach well when he held that ‘[d]espite careless, flat 
statements to the  contrary, the foreign relations of the United States are not in fact wholly 
insulated from the states, are not conducted as though the United States were a unitary 
state.’62 In fact, the federal-state relationship is characterized by jurisdictional overlaps rather 
than by exclusivity, as well as a pragmatic tolerance towards state activities that affect the 
nation’s foreign policy. This tolerance is visible not only in high profile events such as the 
participation of California in the cap-and-trade emissions trading scheme set up by the 
                                                
59 Zivotofsky v Kerry (‘Zivotofsky II’), 576 U. S. ____ (2015), Scalia J dissenting, pp 14-15. 
60 In particular the prohibition on State treaty-making in Article I §10 Cl 3 of the US Constitution. 
61 Duncan Hollis has drawn attention to the proliferation of non-binding agreements between state and foreign governments. 
Even though the Foreign Compact Clause appears to require Congressional consent for such agreements, Congress is rarely 
ever involved, and states usually conclude agreements without involving the federal government. Hollis objects against this 
practice, and argues that substantial arguments exist for subjecting all such agreements – legal and non-legal – to 
supervision by the federal political branches (Hollis, supra note 41 at 745.). 
62 LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 150 (2nd ed. ed. 1996). Similarly, see Young, 
supra note 47 at 340: “The truth is that, in our constitutional system of both horizontal and vertical separation of powers, it 
is virtually impossible for the United States actually to speak ‘with one voice’—in foreign relations or otherwise”; 
GLENNON AND SLOANE, supra note 42 at 88, considering it a mistake to think that the Constitution excludes the states from 
foreign affairs; Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 821 e.s. (1989); Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the One-Voice Myth in US Foreign Relations, 46 
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW 975, 975 (2001): “Congress and the President have full power to expressly pre-empt state and 
local interference with foreign affairs, and they have exercised that power on occasion. But even more often they have 
tolerated, deferred to or even encouraged state and local measures impacting on foreign affairs.” 
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Canadian province of Quebec63, but also in the hundreds if not thousands of low profile 
interactions that take place between state governments and third country governments, and 
which neither Congress nor the courts have the willingness nor the ability to restrict.64  
At the same time, it is important to be mindful of the limits of this tolerance. Be it by relying 
on Curtiss-Wright and the theory of a ‘plenary’ federal foreign affairs power which this ruling 
has come to represent, or through a preemption analysis with functionalist undertones, the 
supremacy of the federal government in the sphere of foreign relations is uncontested in the 
US.65 Unlike in the domestic context, where the federal government can pre-empt state law 
only through the adoption of a statute, per Zschernig, in the sphere of foreign relations a 
federal executive policy can trigger the same effect.66 As Sarah Cleveland has argued: 
‘Congress and the President have full power to expressly pre-empt state and local interference 
with foreign affairs, and they have exercised that power on occasion. But even more often 
they have tolerated, deferred to or even encouraged state and local measures impacting on 
foreign affairs.’67 
It is clear, then, that the federal-state relationship in the US remains characterized by 
hierarchy, not equality, and certainly not by a form of pluralism as is the case in the European 
context.68 States undertake evermore international actions, either directly or indirectly, but the 
constitutionality of these actions depends on the terms of federal foreign policy and the 
federal government’s response to these actions. In this sense, the Madisonian paradigm of 
‘external unity, internal diversity’ remains firmly in place in the US.  
                                                
63 On the Western Climate Initiative, see http://www.wci-inc.org/index.php <accessed 25 February 2017>. 
64 Describing these activities, see generally GLENNON AND SLOANE, supra note 42 at ch 2. On the rise of compacts between 
state and third country governments adopted without Congressional approval, see Hollis, supra note 41. 
65 See, however, the late Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Arizona v US, where he criticized the majority’s opinion for its 
failure to respect the sovereign rights of the state of Arizona. See Arizona v US, 567 U. S. ____ (2012), Scalia J dissenting, 
p 1: ‘Today’s opinion … deprives States of what most would consider the defining characteristic of sovereignty: the power 
to exclude from the sovereign’s territory people who have no right to be there.’ On the ‘anti-federalist’ counter-tradition in 
the US and its enduring influence, see generally ELVIN T. LIM, THE LOVERS’ QUARREL: THE TWO FOUNDINGS AND 
AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (1 edition ed. 2014). 
66 See Zschernig, where the Oregon statute was pre-empted for interference with the federal government’s foreign policy 
towards East-Germany. 
67 Cleveland, supra note 62 at 975. 
68 See below.  
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FEDERALISM AND FOREIGN RELATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: EUROPE’S 
PLURALIST PREDICAMENT 
How is the EU-Member State relationship structured in the sphere of foreign relations? 
Whereas the constitutional landscape in the US is characterized by hierarchy, in the EU it is 
characterized by pluralism, in the sense that the terms of the relationship between the EU and 
the Member States is the product not of compliance by all parties with the constitutional rules 
and principles as interpreted by the federal umpire (in this case, the ECJ), but rather as the 
product of a confrontation between two different conceptions of the nature of the European 
integration project which stand in tension with one another. One such conception is shared by 
the supranational institutions. It understands the EU as a unified institutional actor with 
independent agency on the international stage. Loïc Azoulai has referred to this conception as 
one of ‘integrative institutionalism’69; others have referred to it as the ‘integration through 
law’ paradigm70; yet others, including the ECJ, refer to it as the ‘constitutional’ paradigm, 
understood here in a narrow sense as implying a hierarchical relationship between the EU and 
its Member States.71 Azoulai defined this paradigm as it plays out in the foreign relations 
context as follows:  
This vision [of integrative institutionalism] is based on a basic idea of what is, constitutionally 
speaking, une certaine idée de l’Europe, and is meant to rebut competing visions that tend to 
reduce the Union to a contractual arrangement. It postulates the absolute precedence of the 
Union’s institutional framework in the conduct of external action within the ambit of EU law. 
This is justified firstly by a concern about the consistency and credibility of the EU in the 
international arena. It is crucial that the EU seeks to function and to represent itself to the 
outside world as a unified system even in areas of shared competence. Moreover, by requiring 
the involvement of the supra-national organs with their own independent authority in 
international negotiations, the Court assumes that the common interests will be properly 
defended.72 
                                                
69 See Loïc Azoulai, The Many Visions of Europe. Insights from the Reasoning of the European Court of Justice in External 
Relations Law,  in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS: CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 165–182, 
176–179 (Marise Cremona & Anne Thies eds., 2014).  
70 See seminally PIERRE PESCATORE, LE DROIT DE L’INTÉGRATION: ÉMERGENCE D’UN PHÉNOMÈNE NOUVEAU DANS LES 
RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES SELON L’EXPÉRIENCE DES COMMUNAUTÉS EUROPÉENNES (Sijthoff ed. 1972). 
71 See seminally Judgment in Parti écologiste “Les Verts” v Parliament, C-294/83, para. 25, where the ECJ refers to the EEC 
Treaty as the (then) EEC’s ‘constitutional charter.’ The ‘constitutional’ paradigm was first articulated in Stein, supra note 
25. For a recent defense, see KAARLO TUORI, EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (2015). 
72 Azoulai, supra note 69 at 176. Internal quotation marks omitted. 
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The other conception is shared by many of the Member States. It envisages the EU as an 
contractual association consisting both of likeminded sovereign states and independent EU 
institutions.73 This conception has been referred to as an ‘associative institutionalist’ 
understanding of the European integration process. Azoulai explains:  
Associative institutionalism manifests itself through rules of conduct imposed on Member 
States as well as on European institutions. In particular, a duty of close and loyal cooperation 
applies to the Union and the Member States exercising their powers in areas of exclusive or 
shared Union competence. This procedural framework amounts to a form of discipline that 
requires Member States to adopt a ‘common attitude.’74  
The latter conception finds support amongst many Member States as well as from the 
Council. Alan Dashwood, a former head of the legal service of the Council, for example, has 
referred to the EU as a ‘constitutional order of sovereign states’75 and understands the practice 
of concluding mixed agreements as a practical expression of this paradoxical nature as a 
polity somewhere in between a federal state and an intergovernmental organization.76 In this 
sense, the associative institutionalist paradigm is reminiscent of the conception of the EU as a 
manifestation of ‘constitutional pluralism’, according to which the EU and its Member States 
are bound up together within a common constitutional structure within which their mutual 
relationship is characterized by heterarchy not hierarchy.77   
                                                
73 This does not make the association intergovernmental in nature. In contrast to intergovernmental theories, which 
characterize the relationship between the Member States and the EU institutions in principal-agent terms (see e.g. A. 
Moravcsik, Preference and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach,  in ECONOMIC 
AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION IN EUROPE : INTERNAL DYNAMICS AND GLOBAL CONTEXT (Simon Bulmer ed., 1994).), the 
‘associative institutionalist’ conception recognizes that the EU institutions enjoy a meaningful degree of autonomy.   
74 Azoulai, supra note 69 at 179.  
75 A. Dashwood, The relationship between the member states and the European union/European community, 41 CMLR 355–
381, 356 (2004). 
76 In this sense, see Alan Dashwood, Why Continue to have Mixed Agreements at All?,  in LA COMMUNAUTÉ EUROPÉENNE ET 
LES ACCORDS MIXTES: QUELLES PERSPECTIVES? 93, 93 (Jacques H. J. Bourgeois, Jean-Louis Dewost, & Marie-Ange Gaiffe 
eds., 1997): “Mixed agreements are necessary because of the peculiar nature of the polity created by the Community and 
Union Treaties. That polity is founded on a paradox”. The Member States have limited their sovereign rights under 
arrangements which the Court of Justice have described as a "constitutional charter’? ; and yet they retain the character of 
States in the eyes both of their international partners and of their own peoples’. In a similar sense, see Allan Rosas, Mixed 
Union-Mixed Agreements,  in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 125, 125 (Martti Koskenniemi ed., 
1998): “[T]he European Union being a hybrid conglomerate situated somewhere between a State and an intergovernmental 
organisation, it is only natural that its external relations in general and treaty practice in particular should not be 
straightforward. The phenomenon of mixed agreements ... offers a telling illustration of the complex nature of the EU and 
the Communities as an international actor.” With respect to both authors, the juxtaposition between a ‘state’ and an 
international organization demonstrates a form of dichotomous reasoning within which the genus of the ‘federation’ has no 
independent space of existence. For an effort to create such a space, see OLIVIER BEAUD, THÉORIE DE LA FÉDÉRATION 
(2007).  
77 In this sense, see Daniel Halberstam, Constitutional Heterarchy: The Centrality of Conflict in the European Union and the 
 21 
This section first unpacks both conceptions by exploring their legal expressions. The section 
first examines the ECJ case law on the relationship between the EU and its Member States in 
the context of foreign relations, and then explores the competing understanding of the 
constitutional framework that influences institutional practice. As a preliminary note, it is 
important to emphasize that in the EU context, both the EU and its Member States hold 
certain treaty-making powers, and in this sense thus project the internal diversity that 
characterizes the EU onto the international stage. It follows that, unlike in the US, 
‘federalism’ issues present themselves with a particular urgency in the context of EU foreign 
relations: not only the effectiveness of EU foreign policy is at risk, e.g. through the adoption 
of a statute by an individual state; also the legitimate interests of third countries need to be 
taken into account when addressing ‘federalism’ questions.78  
The  ‘integrative institutionalist’ or ‘constitutional’ paradigm     
In a line of case law reaching back to the 1970s, the ECJ has articulated a doctrine of 
exclusive EU powers to engage in foreign relations. In a fashion reminiscent of the categorical 
approach at work in early US Supreme Court rulings, the ECJ in these cases identified areas 
within which the EU enjoys an exclusive power to act internationally.  
The case law in this area has two strands. A first strand reaches back to the 1971 ERTA case, 
in which the ECJ introduced the principle – now codified in Article 3(2) TFEU – that the EU 
acquires an exclusive power to conclude international agreements in so far as the conclusion 
of a particular agreement may affect common rules or alter their scope.79 The scope of 
application of what became known as the ‘ERTA principle’ has been contested.80 In recent 
case law, the ECJ maintains that if an international agreement is to be concluded on a subject 
                                                                                                                                                   
United States,  in RULING THE WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 326–355 
(Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009). 
78 This difference does not render a comparison between the EU and the US fruitless, however. As Gutman and De Baere 
have argued: ‘[W]hen delving into the relevant case law and the respective constitutional arrangements governing 
international relations in the EU and the US, the analogies may not be exact. Arguably, however, this is not fatal to the 
comparative analysis undertaken here, since despite differences in federal structure, both legal orders are nonetheless faced 
with the common problem inherent to federalism concerning how to balance the need to ensure a coherent international 
relations policy at the central level and the allowance for a certain degree of autonomy of the constituent entities to act in 
the international relations field in order to protect their own interests.’ See De Baere and Gutman, supra note 22 at 137. 
79 Judgment in Commission v Council (‘ERTA’), C-22/70. 
80 For an early analysis of this contestation, see M. Waelbroeck, The Emergent Doctrine of Community Pre-emption -- 
Consent and Re-delegation,  in COURTS AND FREE MARKETS. VOLUME II. 548–580 (Terrance Sandalow & Eric Stein eds., 
1982), in particular 551-552. For a more recent analysis, see Thomas Verellen, The ERTA Doctrine in the Post-Lisbon Era, 
21 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LAW 383–410 (2015). 
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matter which falls within an ‘area’ that is ‘largely covered’ by common EU rules – typically 
internal EU rules – the EU holds an exclusive competence to conclude the agreement. For 
example, in the recent ECJ opinion on the nature of the competence of the EU to conclude the 
Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, 
Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled, the ECJ held that since the area affected by 
the Treaty had been harmonized to an important extent by means of internal EU legislation, 
the ‘area’ within which the Marrakesh Treaty falls is ‘largely covered’ in the meaning of the 
ERTA principle.81 It follows that only the EU has the necessary competence to conclude the 
agreement, and that the Member States are precluded from becoming a Contracting Party in 
their own right. 
A second strand was articulated most forcefully in Opinion 1/75, where the ECJ held that the 
power of the EU to conduct a common commercial policy is exclusive in nature.82 For to 
argue otherwise, the Court held, ‘would amount to recognizing that, in relations with third 
countries, Member States may adopt positions which differ from those which the Community 
intends to adopt, and would thereby distort the institutional framework, call into question the 
mutual trust within the Community and prevent the latter from fulfilling its task in the defence 
of the common interest.’83 The scope of the EU’s exclusive competence to conduct a common 
commercial policy has been a contentious issue in EU law.84 In Daiichi Sankyo, the ECJ was 
again confronted with the question. The case revolved around the question of whether the 
‘commercial aspects of intellectual property’ as addressed in the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) fell within the scope of the EU’s exclusive 
CCP competence, as codified in Article 207 TFEU. The ECJ ruled that TRIPs did fall within 
the scope of the CCP, as the rules on intellectual property rights in that agreement were 
‘related specifically to international trade’, in the sense that they ‘essentially intended to 
promote, facilitate or govern trade and has direct and immediate effects on trade.’85 In Daiichi 
                                                
81 Opinion 3/15 (‘Marrakesh Treaty’). 
82 Opinion 1/75 (‘Understanding on a Local Cost Standard’). 
83 Opinion 1/75, p 1364. 
84 For an early analysis, see e.g. Ulrich Everling, Legal Problems of the Common Commercial Policy in the European 
Economic Community, 4 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 141–165 (1967). 
85 Daiichi Sankyo, paras 51-53. Examining this ruling, see e.g. Joris Larik, No mixed feelings: The post-lisbon common 
commercial policy in Daiichi Sankyo and Commission v. Council (Conditional Access Convention), 52 COMMON MARKET 
LAW REVIEW 779–799 (2015); Yole Tanghe, The EU’s External Competence in IP Matters: The Contribution of the Daiichi 
Sankyo Case to Cloudy Constitutional Concepts, Blurred Borders and the Corresponding Court Jurisdiction, 22 COLUMBIA 
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LAW 139–163 (2015). 
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Sankyo the ECJ reaffirmed a broad reading of the scope of the EU’s exclusive competence to 
conduct a common commercial policy.86 
Both the ERTA principle and the doctrine of a priori exclusivity of which the case law on the 
common commercial policy is the most prominent manifestation serve to ensure that the ‘full 
effectiveness’ of EU law is ensured.87 In the case of the ERTA principle, the main concern is 
to ensure that the Member States are not able, through the use of their powers as sovereign 
states under international law, to undermine or undo the commitments they have taken up 
within the EU framework by adopting EU legislation.88 In this sense, the ERTA principle is 
introspective; it protects the internal acquis communautaire. In the case of the CCP, the aim is 
to protect the full effectiveness of the powers of the EU and the capacity of the EU institutions 
to engage in international trade relations. The doctrine of a priori exclusivity is thus more 
outward-looking, as it seeks to ensure that the EU is able to protect the ‘common EU interest’ 
on the international stage.89 
It is important to have a clear grasp of the implications of both doctrines, which are 
potentially far-reaching. Two factors are relevant in this regard. First, the concept of an ‘area 
largely covered’ potentially empowers the EU to replace the Member States in a wide range 
of international negotiations. Much depends on how broadly the relevant ‘area’ is defined; at 
this point little clarity has been provided on this question, which leaves open the possibility 
for the ECJ to endorse a broad understanding of the term. Second, it is necessary to read 
                                                
86 In a similar sense, see Judgment in Commission v Council (‘Conditional Access’), C-137/12, where the ECJ ruled that the 
European Convention on the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of, conditional access had to be adopted on 
the basis of the EU’s competence to conduct a common commercial policy, and not on the basis of the EU’s competence 
over the internal market. Conditional Access together with Daiichi has been read as heralding a ‘sea change’ in the area of 
the CCP due to the Court’s broad reading of the EU’s exclusive competence. See Larik, supra note 85 at 798: “The 
combined effect of the judgments annotated represents a sea change in the area of the CCP. Each fully endorsed the 
expanded boundaries of exclusive Union competence based on the changes introduced by the Lisbon reform, ending two 
decades of mixed feelings in the relations of the EU and its Member States within the WTO and other trade-related areas 
following Opinion 1/94.” 
87 See e.g. the ERTA judgment, para. 31: ‘Community powers exclude the possibility of concurrent powers on the part of 
Member States, since any steps taken outside the framework of the Community institutions would be incompatible with the 
unity of the Common Market and the uniform application of Community law.’ In this sense, see also Marise Cremona, EU 
External Relations: Unity and Conferral of Powers,  in THE QUESTION OF COMPETENCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 65–85, 68 
(Loïc Azoulai ed., 2014): “[T]he approach to both express and implied competence was based on conceptions of 
effectiveness and unity, and in the initial cases the Court assumes that unity requires a transfer of competence and therefore 
exclusivity.” 
88 Ibid, para. 22: ‘[T]o the extent to which Community rules are promulgated for the attainment of the objectives of the 
Treaty, the Member States cannot, outside the framework of the Community institutions, assume obligations which might 
affect those rules or alter their scope.’ 
89 The link between internal and external competences has been pointed out in Cremona, supra note 87 at 65. 
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together the ECJ’s case law on the scope of the common commercial policy with a related line 
of case law on the choice of the substantive legal basis upon which the EU is required to act. 
Typically, this case law is invoked and relied upon in a context in which a disagreement exists 
between the EU institutions on the required decision-making procedures. There is no reason, 
however, to believe that this line of case law ought not to be applied also to assess the scope 
of the CCP, and thus the scope of the EU’s exclusive competence.90  
The doctrine of the choice of legal basis requires the EU legislator to select as few legal bases 
as possible when enacting a norm.91 To do so, the legislator must identify the ‘center of 
gravity’ of a proposed act, such as a Council decision to start negotiations towards an 
international agreement, or a decision concluding such an agreement. ‘Ancillary’ or 
‘incidental’ aspects of an agreement can in this way be ‘absorbed’ into the ‘center of gravity’ 
of the agreement. Here again, the logic of the ECJ’s case law points towards a broad reading 
of the scope of the EU’s competences, in this case its exclusive competence. The ‘center of 
gravity’ test can be understood as the functional equivalent of the ‘area largely covered’ test at 
work in the framework of the ERTA case law. In both instances, the ECJ has articulated a 
potentially far-reaching exclusive competence for the EU to act on the international stage. 
The ECJ’s case law is grounded in Azoulai’s ‘integrative institutionalist’ conception of the 
EU-Member State relationship, as the recognition of an exclusive competence for the EU to 
act precludes the Member States from acting on the international stage. Instead, they are 
required to act within and through the EU institutions, in particular the European Council and 
the Council, and in accordance with the decision-making procedures set out in the Treaties, 
which confer significant powers also to the supranational institutions. These procedures 
diverge from traditional international legal practice, where decisions must generally be taken 
                                                
90 As Advocate General Wahl argued in the recent Opinion 3/15, to identify the nature of the EU’s competence, it is 
necessary, first, to determine whether an EU competence exists. To make this assessment it is necessary ‘to identify the 
correct substantive legal basis (or bases) for the decision at issue. In the system created by the EU treaties, which is based 
on the principle of conferral, the choice of the correct legal basis for a proposed act by the institutions is of constitutional 
significance. That choice determines whether the Union has the power to act, for what purposes it may act and the 
procedure that it will have to follow in the event that it may act.’ See Opinion AG Wahl in Opinion 3/15, paras 30-31. The 
AG went on to determine whether Article 207 TFEU (on the CCP) could be relied on as the only substantive legal basis 
upon which to conclude the Marrakesh Treaty, or whether other legal bases were required to supplement Article 207 TFEU. 
Supporting an application of the ‘center of gravity’ test to questions involving the nature of EU competence, see also 
Fernando Castillo de la Torre, The Court of Justice and External Competences After Lisbon: Some Reflections on the Latest 
Case Law,  in THE EUROPEAN UNION’S EXTERNAL ACTION IN TIMES OF CRISIS 129–186, 184 (Piet Eeckhout & Manual 
Lopez-Escudero eds., 2016).: ‘It has been often argued that the approach of predominant/incidental or principal and 
ancillary applies between legal bases, but not in the horizontal division of competences between the EU and its Member 
States.’ 
91 For a summary of the approach to be followed, see Opinion AG Wahl in Opinion 3/15, paras 30-34. 
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by unanimity in order to protect the equality of states, which remains a fundamental principle 
of international law. Within a strictly EU framework, as opposed to a ‘hybrid’ mixed 
framework92, decision-making most often takes place by means of qualified majority voting, 
typically coupled with a requirement of consent by the European Parliament.  
Despite flirtations with what Loïc Azoulai has referred to as ‘associative institutionalism’ – 
i.e. a conception of the nature of the EU-Member State relationship in which institutions 
remain important, but in which the objective is no longer to require the Member States to act 
through the EU institutions, but rather to ensure that they act jointly with the EU on the 
international stage93 –  it is tentatively suggested that the ECJ today has returned to the 
‘integrative institutionalist’ paradigm which characterized its early case law in this area. 
Characteristic of this paradigm is the Court’s willingness to recognize exclusive competences, 
typically on the basis of the ERTA principle.94  
The ‘associative institutionalist’ or ‘constitutional pluralist’ paradigm 
The ECJ’s emphasis on articulating a broad reading of the EU’s exclusive competences stands 
in tension with the reading of the Treaty framework defended by the Council and most of the 
                                                
92 On the difficulties involved in maintaining the full effectiveness of the EU’s decision-making rules, see Thomas Verellen, 
On Hybrid Decisions Mixed Agreements and the Limits of the New Legal Order: Commission v Council (’US Air Transport 
Agreement’), 53 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 741–762 (2016). 
93 Of particular relevance in this regard are, on the one hand, the cases in which the ECJ, confusingly, declared the EU and its 
Member States ‘jointly’ competent to conclude an agreement (see in particular Opinion 2/91 (‘ILO Convention’) and 
Opinion 1/94 (‘WTO’), and, on the other hand, the line of case law in which the ECJ doctrinally developed the concept of a 
‘duty of sincere cooperation’ (see in particular Judgment in Commission v Sweden (‘PFOS’), C-246/07). This ‘associative’ 
turn has been taken up enthusiastically by commentators. See e.g. Eleftheria Neframi, The Duty of Loyalty: Rethinking its 
Scope through its Application in the Field of EU External Relations, 47 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 323–359 (2010); 
Christophe Hillion, Mixity and Coherence in EU External Relations: The Significance of the “Duty of Cooperation,”  in 
MIXED AGREEMENTS REVISITED: THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES IN THE WORLD 87–115, 87 (Christophe Hillion & Panos 
Koutrakos eds., 2010), speaking of the “polyphonic nature of the Union’s external action.” 
94 See most recently Opinion 3/15 (‘Marrakesh Treaty’) where the ECJ recognized ERTA-type exclusivity with regard to the 
entire international agreement. In a similar sense, see also Opinion 1/13 (‘Hague Convention’) and the judgment in 
Neighboring Rights (C-114/12). In both instances, the ECJ recognized ERTA-type exclusivity, drawing on the precedent 
established in Opinion 2/91 (‘ILO Convention No 170’) where the ECJ recognized that ERTA-type exclusivity can arise if 
an ‘area’ is ‘largely covered’ by common EU rules. For a critical analysis of this line of case law, see Verellen, supra note 
80, highlighting the tension in the Court’s case law between the “area largely covered” line of reasoning and the competing 
emphasis on the need for a “comprehensive and detailed analysis” of the relationship between the proposed international 
agreement and pre-existing common EU rules. For a recent in-depth analysis, see also Amedeo Arena, Exercise of EU 
Competences and Pre-emption of Member States’ Powers in the Internal and the External Sphere: Towards “Grand 
Unification”?,  YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW 1–78 (2016). The forthcoming ECJ opinion on the nature of the EU’s 
competence to conclude a trade agreement with Singapore will be an important test case in this regard. It remains to be seen 
whether the ECJ will retain its emphasis on exclusivity and a broad reading of the competences of the EU also when 
reviewing a particularly broadly framed trade agreement, which, moreover, has been subject to political contestation.  See 
Opinion 2/15, pending. Advocate General Sharpston advised the Court against recognizing full exclusivity. See Opinion 
AG Sharpston in Opinion 2/15. 
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Member States.95 On two issues in particular they defend a reading of the Treaties that stands 
in tension if not conflict with the ECJ’s case law introduced in the above: first, on the issue of 
the scope of the ERTA principle and, second, on the issue of the nature of the EU’s shared 
competences. On both issues the Council and several Member States defend views that are 
difficult to reconcile with the Treaties as interpreted by the ECJ. Taken together, the Council 
and Member State position on both of these issues serves to ensure that the EU remains 
unable to act independently on the international stage and instead remains required to act 
‘jointly’ with the Member States, in the sense that when making a treaty, not only the EU, but 
also the Member States must become a Contracting Party to the agreement. Both issues will 
be briefly unpacked.  
(a) The scope of the ERTA principle 
Against the ‘area largely covered’ approach favored by the ECJ, the Member States defend 
what a member of the legal service of the Commission recently referred to as an ‘atomistic’ 
approach.96 Under this approach, it is necessary to determine for each individual provision of 
an international agreement whether it affects common EU rules or alters their scope in the 
meaning of the ERTA principle. Despite the ECJ’s rejection of this approach in its post-
Lisbon case law, Member States continue to defend it. In the recent Opinion 3/15 on the 
Marrakesh Treaty, for example, several Member State governments advanced arguments that 
relied on the premise that an ERTA effect must be determined on a provision-by-provision 
basis. For example, they considered that the provision of a possibility for Member States to 
provide for exceptions or limitations to EU copyright rules implies that with regard to the 
provisions of the Marrakesh Treaty which render obligatory the provision of such exceptions 
or limitations, no ERTA effect has occurred and the Member States instead have ‘retained’ a 
competence to act internationally. The ECJ did not follow the Member States, and instead 
ruled that the area was ‘largely covered’ by common EU rules. This implied that no 
provision-specific analysis was required.97  
                                                
95 The tension between constitutional principle and institutional practice has been pointed out also in Cremona, supra note 87 
at 74–80. 
96 Castillo de la Torre, supra note 90 at 163. The tension between both approaches has first been identified in Waelbroeck, 
supra note 80 at 551–552. 
97 For an analysis, see Thomas Verellen, OPINION 3/15 ON THE MARRAKESH TREATY: ECJ REAFFIRMS NARROW “MINIMUM 
HARMONISATION” EXCEPTION TO ERTA PRINCIPLE EUROPEAN LAW BLOG (2017), 
http://europeanlawblog.eu/2017/03/01/opinion-315-on-the-marrakesh-treaty-ecj-reaffirms-narrow-minimum-harmonisation-
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In the Neighboring Rights case, on the nature of the EU’s competence to conclude an 
international agreement on the protection of the neighboring rights of broadcasting 
organizations, Advocate General Sharpston had adopted a similarly ‘atomistic’ approach, 
leading her to engage in a lengthy, detailed analysis of the provisions of the proposed 
international agreement.98 This analysis eventually led her to conclude that for most aspects of 
the agreement, the EU had acquired an exclusive competence on the basis of the ERTA 
principle, but not for all. As the lack of exclusive competence for one provision implies that 
the entire agreement must be subjected to Member State approval, the proposed agreement in 
AG Sharpston’s view ought to have been concluded as a mixed agreement.99 The ECJ did not 
agree, however. It considered instead that the subject matter of the international agreement 
‘falls within an area covered to a large extent by common EU rules and that those negotiations 
may affect common EU rules or alter their scope.’100 It followed that the entire agreement fell 
within the scope of the EU’s exclusive competence, and that therefore the Member states had 
been precluded from joining the agreement as a Contracting Party. 
(b) The nature of shared competences 
The Member State emphasis on reading narrowly the exclusive competences of the EU goes 
hand in hand with an insistence on the essentially political nature of the decision of the 
Council not to exercise the EU’s shared competences for part of a proposed international 
agreement, even if this agreement in its entirety falls within the scope of the EU’s shared 
competences. As two members of the legal service of the Council recently argued:  
[T]he practice of the Council has shown an attachment to the literal meaning of the provisions 
of the Treaty of Lisbon, reflecting the views of most (and on occasion all) Member States that 
any competence not yet exercised by the Union, even for specific aspects in a field largely 
regulated by the Union, remains with the Member States and that it is an entirely discretionary 
                                                                                                                                                   
exception-to-erta-principle/ (last visited Mar 30, 2017). 
98 Opinion of AG Sharpston in Commission v Council (‘Neighboring Rights’), C-114/12.  
99 Advocate General Kokott made this point in her opinion in the Vietnam case, where she held that ‘[j]ust as a little drop of 
pastis can turn a glass of water milky, individual provisions, however secondary, in an international agreement … can make 
it necessary to conclude a shared agreement.’ See Opinion of AG Kokott in Commission v Council (‘Vietnam’), C-13/07, 
para. 121.  
100 Judgment in Commission v Council (‘Neighboring Rights’), C-114/12, para. 102. 
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and political choice whether in any given case the Union chooses to exercise a shared 
competence, or not to do so.101 
By maintaining this position – the legality of which thus far has not been tested before the 
ECJ – the Member States are able to ensure that most international agreements take the form 
of a mixed agreement. This, in turn, ensures that Member States retain full control over the 
EU decision-making process, as it reintroduces international law, and thus unanimity, into the 
equation.  
As with the Member States’ insistence on the ‘atomistic’ reading of the ERTA principle, their 
insistence on the political nature of the decision not to exercise the EU’s shared competence 
with regard to as little as a single provision of an international agreement runs counter the 
spirit of the Treaty framework as interpreted by the ECJ and, in any case, is at odds with the 
‘integrative institutionalist’ understanding of the European integration project. In doctrinal 
terms, the issue is the absence of a well-developed concept of shared competence in EU law, 
in particular in the sphere of EU foreign relations law. Part of the difficulty stems from the 
widespread yet erroneous belief that if a competence is ‘shared’ some parts of the competence 
rest with the Member States while other parts rest with the EU, and that consequently action 
by both the EU and its Member States is required if international action is to be undertaken.102 
This view runs counter the text of the Treaties, which in Article 2(2) TFEU provides that  
[w]hen the Treaties confer on the Union a competence shared with the Member States in a 
specific area, the Union and the Member States may legislate and adopt legally binding acts in 
that area. The Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has 
not exercised its competence. The Member States shall again exercise their competence to the 
extent that the Union has decided to cease exercising its competence. 
Put differently, the Treaties understand ‘shared’ competence in a similar way as does the 
German Basic Law, i.e. as concurrent, rather than parallel competences. This means, in 
                                                
101 Gosalbo-Bono and Naert, supra note 2 at 23. In the same sense, see e.g. J. HELISKOSKI, MIXED AGREEMENTS AS A 
TECHNIQUE FOR ORGANIZING THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND ITS MEMBER STATES 42 
(2001). 
102 The situation in which EU shared competence covers a proposed international agreement in its entirety ought to be 
distinguished from the situation in which the EU lacks any competence to act. In this type of circumstance, recourse to the 
technique of the mixed agreement is necessary. The distinction has been referred as one between obligatory and facultative 
mixity. On this distinction, see Rafael Leal-Arcas, The European Community and Mixed Agreements, 6 EUROPEAN FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS REVIEW 483–513, 494 (2001). 
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particular, that while both orders of government have a power to act within the same sphere, 
in principle they cannot act jointly, and one can only act in so far as the other has not acted.103  
To this observation must be added another one. It is difficult to see how the practice of not 
exercising the EU’s shared competence with regard to, in extreme cases, a single provision 
can be reconciled with the requirement that EU norms (both internal and external) must be 
adopted on the basis of a legal basis that corresponds with the ‘center of gravity’ of the 
proposed norm or international agreement. For it follows from the requirement that decisions 
are to be adopted on the basis of the legal basis corresponding to their center of gravity that 
ancillary or incidental aspects of the decision (and by extension, in the context of foreign 
relations, an international agreement) do not play a role in the overall division of competences 
assessment.  
This observation, coupled with the fact that shared competences ought to be understood as 
concurrent competences, supports the view that within the sphere of the EU’s shared 
competence, Member States cannot act when the EU acts.104 Consequently, if the Member 
States cannot act, the Council must act, as it cannot have been the intention of the Treaty 
Framers that neither party is empowered to act. ‘Facultative’ mixity, then, arguably is 
incompatible with the Treaties.  
(c) Europe’s pluralist predicament 
Despite the tension between the reading of the Treaty framework articulated by the ECJ, 
institutional practice stays fairly close to the interpretation of that framework defended by the 
Council and the Member States. It is not difficult to see why: as the Commission and the 
Parliament cannot on every occasion bring a matter before the ECJ, the decision of the 
Member States within the Council on the format of the EU’s participation in international 
negotiations is in many if not most instances final. In this sense, not unlike the situation in the 
United States, where the position of the executive branch on the scope of its own powers is 
                                                
103 For an argument in this sense in a closely related context, see Opinion of AG Kokott in Commission v Council 
(‘Vietnam’), C-13/07, paras 75-76. 
104 The contentious issue in this regard is how broadly one ought to define the area within which the EU acts. In the Member 
States’ view, individual provisions constitute the relevant ‘area.’ A reading of the ECJ’s case law on the ERTA principle 
and the choice of legal basis, however, support the view that the relevant area is the area covered by the proposed 
international action.  
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for practical purposes authoritative105, the Council in the EU framework is to an important 
extent the master of the scope of its own competence.106  
Member State insistence on the abovementioned ‘atomistic’ reading of the EU’s competences 
places the supranational institutions (in particular the Commission, but increasingly also the 
European Parliament107) in a difficult position. On the one hand, their reading of the Treaty 
framework requires them to object against the Council’s narrow reading of the EU’s 
competences. On the other hand, to insist too strongly creates a risk of non-compliance with 
ECJ rulings.108 In this sense, the delicate dance that takes place between the Member States 
and the Council on the one hand, and the Commission, Parliament and the ECJ on the other is 
reminiscent of the ‘pluralist’ dance that takes places between the ECJ and the high courts of 
the Member States.109 In both contexts, the ECJ and the Member State actors – high courts 
and executives – are compelled to engage in a process of mutual accommodation.  
This process of mutual accommodation takes the form of a policy of allegedly constructive 
ambiguity on certain aspects of the EU constitutional landscape.110 Such constructive 
ambiguity is visible most clearly with regard to the issue of the nature of the EU’s shared 
                                                
105 Harold Koh famously argued that ‘in foreign affairs the President (almost) always wins’ (see Harold Hongju Koh, Why the 
President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL 1255–
1342 (1988).). 
106 Many decades ago, John Costonis already warned against the pernicious consequences of having the Council define the 
scope of its own competences by having the Council decide on the appropriateness of mixity. See John J. Costonis, The 
Treaty-Making Power of the European Economic Community: The Perspectives of a Decade, 5 COMMON MARKET LAW 
REVIEW 421–457, 452 (1968): “Substituting the Council for the Community Court as the agency that passes on the 
compatibility of a proposed accord with the Rome Treaty, is like having the wolves guard the sheep. Properly concerned 
under the best of circumstances with representing and defending the interests of the member states, the Council is subject to 
a severe institutional bias to construe the Community”s powers as narrowly as possible. Further, the Council’s decisions, 
which are taken behind closed doors and are generally responsive to highly political forces, hardly provide a solid basis 
upon which to build a harmonious body of precedents and doctrine regarding the ambit of the Community’s treaty-making 
powers’. 
107 On the role of the European Parliament in the treaty-making process, see generally Riccardo Passos, Mixed Agreements 
from the Perspective of the European Parliament.,  in MIXED AGREEMENTS REVISITED: THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES IN 
THE WORLD 231–248 (Christophe Hillion & Panos Koutrakos eds., 2010). 
108 Warning against this risk, see Gosalbo-Bono and Naert, supra note 2 at 26: “[I]t appears doubtful that the Council and its 
Member States will change their position about mixity, a practice that, reinforced with provisional application, is founded 
on the fundamental principle of conferral and which in their view has proven to be very useful.” 
109 On constitutional pluralism in the judicial setting, see the contributions in JAN KOMAREK & MATEJ AVBELJ, 
CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BEYOND (2012). The theory was first articulated in NEIL 
MACCORMICK, QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY (2001). 
110 On the usefulness of such constructive ambiguity, see generally MICHAEL FOLEY, THE SILENCE OF CONSTITUTIONS 
(ROUTLEDGE REVIVALS): GAPS, “ABEYANCES” AND POLITICAL TEMPERAMENT IN THE MAINTENANCE OF GOVERNMENT xi 
(2013), defining an abeyance as “a form of tacit and instinctive agreement to condone, and even cultivate, constitutional 
ambiguity as an acceptable strategy for resolving conflict.” 
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competence.111 It is indeed remarkable that in the several decades of litigation on the division 
of competences between the EU and its Member States in the sphere of foreign relations, the 
Commission has never requested the Court to rule on the precise meaning of ‘shared 
competence’ in the external sphere.112 At the same time, it is remarkable that the ECJ has not 
tackled the issue on its own initiative. Instead, most stakeholders have avoided the issue, and 
have instead focused on clarifying the scope of the EU’s exclusive competences.113 
This ‘black box’ can be understood as the battlefield of systemic (as opposed to 
constitutional) pluralism in the sphere of foreign relations. The Commission and the Council 
maintain conflicting positions, yet no occasion has arisen in which the Commission (or the 
Parliament) has directly challenged the Council’s interpretation of the nature of shared 
competences.114 Yet, this constructive ambiguity is not neutral, as in practice the position of 
the Member States prevails, and the EU must in most instances act ‘jointly’ with the Member 
States on the international stage.115 In this sense, the dynamic at work in the foreign relations 
context leads to the opposite result compared to  the judicial context, where despite Member 
State high courts’ objections against the primacy of EU law, as a practical matter they do 
apply the principle, and do comply with the rulings of the ECJ.116 Put differently, the costs for 
                                                
111 The very instrument of the mixed agreement is, however, a mechanism to protect ambiguity. In this sense, see e.g. on the 
rationale of mixity: Geert De Baere, EU External Action,  in EUROPEAN UNION LAW 704–750, 738 (Catherine Barnard & 
Steve Peers eds., 2014): “Their lack of clarity as to the precise vertical division of competences makes mixed agreements 
suitable for enabling the Union to act internationally while keeping the competence situation sufficiently vague so as not to 
affect openly the Member States” external competences’. 
112 Note, however, that de la Torre suggests that this might change. See Castillo de la Torre, supra note 90 at 186: “The next 
step should be the definition of the conditions of exercise and the legal consequences of shared competences. It may come 
sooner than expected.” 
113 Note, however, that the ECJ in a number of rulings has given an implicit blessing to the practice of concluding mixed 
agreements. In this sense, see Christiaan W. A. Timmermans, The Court of Justice and Mixed Agreements,  in THE COURT 
OF JUSTICE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE: ANALYSES AND PERSPECTIVES ON SIXTY YEARS OF CASE-LAW - LA COUR DE 
JUSTICE ET LA CONSTRUCTION DE L’EUROPE: ANALYSES ET PERSPECTIVES DE SOIXANTE ANS DE JURISPRUDENCE 659–673, 663 
(Court of Justice of the European Union ed., 2013), http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-90-6704-897-2_35 (last 
visited Feb 1, 2015): “If ... mixed agreements are attractive for Member States, it might also be said that the Court has 
considerably contributed to enabling their success.” 
114 It is noteworthy that in the US Air Transort Agreement case, the Commission expressly refrained from challenging the 
choice for mixity. See Judgment in US Air Transport Agreement, para. 46: ‘In the present case, it is not in dispute that the 
Accession Agreement and the Ancillary Agreement are mixed agreements.’ 
115 In 2010, Ricardo Passos wrote that ‘the potential treaty-making power of the Union is seldom resorted to in order to 
conclude a pure Union agreement. Indeed, most of the 250 mixed agreements in force are examples of ’voluntary mixity’ 
(voluntary on the side of the Member States, because they want it).’ See Passos, supra note 107 at 282. 
116 See, however, the recent ruling by the Danish Supreme Court in which it refused to disapply a Danish statute considered 
by the ECJ as standing in conflict with the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of age, which the ECJ had 
recognized as a general principle of EU law. On the confrontation between the Danish Supreme Court and the ECJ, see 
Sune Klinge, EU LAW ANALYSIS: DIALOGUE OR DISOBEDIENCE BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE DANISH 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT? THE DANISH SUPREME COURT CHALLENGES THE MANGOLD-PRINCIPLE EU LAW ANALYSIS (2016), 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2016/12/dialogue-or-disobedience-between.html (last visited Mar 25, 2017). For similar 
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the EU of accommodating Member States’ insistence on state sovereignty are higher in the 
foreign relations context than they are in the internal, judicial context: whereas in the latter 
pluralism favors the EU, in the latter context it favors the Member States.  
COMPARATIVE REFLECTIONS: HIERARCHY VERSUS PLURALISM, AND THE PERILS 
OF ‘AS IF’ CONSTITUTIONALISM 
The constitutional landscape that emerges from the analysis in this paper is thus radically 
different in the United States and the European Union. As described, in the US, individual 
states can to some extent engage in foreign relations broadly understood. Yet, in constitutional 
terms, their ability to do so is limited, as they act within a constitutional framework which 
unambiguously endorses the supremacy of the foreign policy of the federal government. State 
autonomy is thus always precarious in the United States, and depends on the degree of federal 
tolerance vis-à-vis state international activities.  
In the EU context, the constitutional landscape is rather different. Surely, one similarity must 
be acknowledged: both in the US and the EU, the ‘federal’ (or EU) order of governance 
articulates a claim to supremacy within the sphere of foreign relations. Initially, in both 
polities this claim took the form of a doctrine of exclusive powers, under which within certain 
areas only the ‘federal’ (or EU) order of governance was empowered to act. In a later stage, in 
the US context this categorical approach was replaced with a reliance on preemption 
principles, which, however, did maintain strong functionalist undertones favoring the 
supremacy of federal foreign policy. However, while in the US this claim to supremacy is 
uncontested, in the EU it remains the object of contestation by the member units of the 
compound EU polity in the ways described in the above.  
This difference raises a question: ought the present pluralist predicament be maintained, or 
ought a clear choice to be made between the two competing conceptions of the EU-Member 
State relationship – the integrative institutionalist/constitutional conception on the one hand, 
and the associative/constitutional pluralist conception on the other? Should the Commission 
further pursue its legal strategy of trying to persuade the ECJ to articulate a broad reading of 
the EU’s exclusive powers in the sphere of foreign relations? Ought it perhaps invite the ECJ 
                                                                                                                                                   
difficulties in the Czech Republic, see also Zdenek Kühn, Ultra Vires Review and the Demise of Constitutional Pluralism: 
The Czecho-Slovak Pension Saga, and the Dangers of State Courts’ Defiance of EU Law, 23 MAASTRICHT JOURNAL OF 
EUROPEAN AND COMPARATIVE LAW 185–194 (2016).  
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to articulate its view on the nature of shared competences? Or ought it perhaps further pursue 
the strategy of persuading the Court to put further flesh on the notion of a ‘duty of sincere 
cooperation’, through which individual Member States would in some instances be under a 
legal obligation not to act on the international stage? Or, alternatively, ought some of these 
questions, as the Council suggests with its reference to the ‘political’ character of the decision 
to exercise shared competences, to be left to the political process? 
The issue is brought in particular focus when it is examined against the backdrop of the 
functionalist arguments advanced in the US context in favor of federal supremacy over 
foreign relations. Such supremacy is typically justified on the basis of the consideration that 
an effective federal foreign policy is only possible within a framework within which the US 
speaks with one (read: a federal) voice. Clearly, in the EU as well, an argument could be 
made – as the ECJ did in fact make in Opinion 1/75, where the Court introduced the notion of 
a ‘common EU interest’ to justify the exclusive nature of the EU’s competence over 
international trade – that the effectiveness of EU foreign relations would benefit if the 
Member States would be precluded from joining the EU in acting on the international stage. 
Undoubtedly, the effectiveness of EU decision-making would benefit if the EU would be able 
to act independently from the Member States on the basis of the procedures set out in the EU 
Treaties. Furthermore, as suggested in the above, persuasive legal arguments can be advanced 
in support of this proposition.  
Yet, advancing such legal arguments perhaps is not a wise policy to pursue. As Justice Scalia 
alluded to in the fragment cited in the above, functionalism is not neutral. It is perhaps 
characteristic of the context of foreign relations that functionalist arguments presuppose a 
normative preference for one level of governance over the other, and that in the final analysis, 
a choice must be made between ensuring the effectiveness of the policies pursued by the 
federal or member unit governments. To demonstrate this point: in articulating a response to 
Russian aggression in Ukraine, a trade-off must be made between the EU policy of imposing 
economic sanctions on Russia on the one hand, and the policy individual Member States 
pursue of attracting Russian investment, for example in the field of nuclear energy.117 To 
allow both policies to be pursued in parallel undermines the effectiveness of the EU’s 
sanctions regime. In other words, acknowledging that to some extent something or someone 
                                                
117 Hungarian MPs approve Russia nuclear deal, BBC NEWS, February 6, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
26072303 (last visited Apr 12, 2017). 
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has to give, is inevitable in some instances. In this sense, establishing the constitutional 
balance between the EU and its Member States, at least in the context of foreign relations, 
must at least in some instances be understood as a zero-sum game, which in turn requires that 
a normative choice be made between one level of governance and the other.118  
The US experience can be helpful to take into account when reflecting on this issue. It can be 
helpful in two ways, with each way pointing in a different direction. On the one hand, the US 
experience lends support to the view that for a federation to be able to effectively defend its 
common interests in an international environment which is not always friendly towards that 
federation (as was the case in the early United States119, and as is arguably currently the case 
in Europe120), it must be able to articulate and identify its common interests, and possess the 
necessary means – political, economic, fiscal as well as legal – to successfully pursue these 
interests.121 As is well-recorded, the 1789 Constitution is itself the product of considerations 
of this type. It thus does not come as a surprise that throughout US constitutional history – in 
any case not since the Civil War-era122 – the supremacy of the federal government in the 
sphere of foreign relations has not meaningfully been contested. The US constitutional 
                                                
118 In this sense, see e.g. NYE, supra note 17 at 90, recognizing that interactions with foreign powers can be both zero- and 
positive-sum games. This viewpoint does not appear to be shared in the recent literature on EU foreign relations law, which 
appears to agree that the co-existence of ‘multiple voices’ is a strength, not a weakness. This in turn presupposes an 
understanding of international relations as perhaps overtly optimistic and involving nothing but positive-sum transactions. 
See e.g. Hillion, supra note 93 at 87.  
119 Foreign interference in the domestic affairs of the American Confederation was one of the driving forces behind the 
Philadelphia Convention and ultimately the adoption of the 1789 Constitution. On the difficulties the Confederation 
experienced in its dealings with foreign powers, see GEORGE C. HERRING, FROM COLONY TO SUPERPOWER: U.S. FOREIGN 
RELATIONS SINCE 1776 ch 1 (1 edition ed. 2011).  
120 In this sense, see Charlemagne: Europe’s ring of fire. The European Union’s neighbourhood is more troubled than ever, 
THE ECONOMIST, September 20, 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21618846-european-unions-neighbourhood-
more-troubled-ever-europes-ring-fire (last visited Mar 26, 2017). See also the recent analysis by Daniel Kelemen and 
Mitchell Orenstein, who argue that as EU foreign policy (in particular the common foreign and security policy) becomes 
more effective, hostile foreign powers increase (and successfully so) their efforts at developing leverage over weaker EU 
Member States. See Mitchell A. Orenstein & R. Daniel Kelemen, Trojan Horses in EU Foreign Policy, 55 JCMS: JOURNAL 
OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES 87–102 (2017). 
121 The federation must, in other words, be able to yield power on the international stage. On the concept of power, see NYE, 
supra note 17, arguing for a broad conception of power as including not only the ability to coerce others, but also to shape 
their preferences. It is fair to say that the EU historically has been strong with regard to the latter (see the literature on 
‘normative power Europe’, e.g. R. WHITMAN, NORMATIVE POWER EUROPE: EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
(2011).) but not very strong with regard to the former, with the EU’s ‘hard power’ capabilities remaining very limited up 
until this day.  
122 In addition to the slavery question, the secession of the southern states was in part driven by foreign policy considerations, 
in particular diverging perspectives on free trade. Whereas the northern states favored the imposition of tariffs with the view 
of protecting domestic industries, the southern states favored free trade in order to ensure their continued access to foreign 
markets for their agricultural products. In this sense, the Civil War could be understood also as a radical contestation of the 
supremacy of the federal government over US foreign relations. On this aspect of the Civil War, see e.g. Marc-William 
Palen, The Civil War’s Forgotten Transatlantic Tariff Debate and the Confederacy’s Free Trade Diplomacy, 3 THE 
JOURNAL OF THE CIVIL WAR ERA 35–61 (2013). 
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experience in this sense is a useful reminder of precisely why unity in foreign relations is in 
itself an important value to protect.   
On the other hand, however, the broader US experience also lends support to the view that 
there is only so much that the courts can or ought to achieve in contributing to the EU’s 
efforts at speaking with one voice, and that indeed support for an effective ‘federal’ (EU) 
foreign policy requires support also from the political branches (in the EU context: the 
Council). It is uncontroversial to suggest that a reading of the US Constitution which leaves 
little room for the states to engage in foreign relations is very much in line with the spirit of 
that document. The origins of the Constitution, as documented e.g. in the Federalist Papers, 
lend support to this viewpoint. It follows that in the US context, the tension between the 
stakeholders – the federal government and the individual states – is much less pronounced. 
This is visible not only in what the Constitution has to say specifically on foreign relations – it 
only delegates powers to the federal government and only prohibits the states from 
undertaking certain actions – but also in the broader constitutional context within which the 
federal government operates. Of particular significance in this regard is the federal 
government’s full fiscal independence from the individual states, as well as the fact that the 
US military is subject to federal as opposed to state control. These structural features of the 
US ‘foreign affairs constitution’ have contributed to the development of the federal 
government as the main driver of foreign policy in the United States, and have indeed allowed 
the US federal government to emerge out of World War II as the world’s leading superpower. 
In the EU context, which is so thoroughly legalized, it is tempting to lose structural factors 
such as these out of sight and rely instead – perhaps to an excessive extent – on the law and 
on litigation before the ECJ as a means to achieve constitutional cohesion. This does not mean 
that such structural considerations do not play a role in the case law of the ECJ, however. For 
example, it is clear that control by the Member States over much of the fiscal resources 
required to put into effect EU foreign policy has an impact on the balance of power between 
the EU and its Member States, including at the legal level.123 This was visible, for example, in 
the context of Opinion 1/78, where the ECJ ruled that no exclusive EU competence could be 
                                                
123 The issue of the lack of independent EU fiscal resources has recently been placed on the political agenda by the 
publication of the so-called ‘Monti Report.’ See MARIO MONTI ET AL., FUTURE FINANCING OF THE EU. FINAL REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP ON OWN RESOURCES DECEMBER 2016 (2017). 
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recognized for the establishment of a particular fund if that fund was to be financed with 
Member State resources.124  
The point is, however, that structural factors such as the lack of independent fiscal resources 
and the absence of an integrated EU army are issues that cannot be resolved by the courts, or 
by means of legal argument more generally. They require Treaty amendment. However, for 
amendments to be adopted that would strengthen the EU’s capacity to act effectively on the 
international stage, the project of European integration in general, and the project of 
developing the EU as an independent and effective foreign policy actor more specifically 
must enjoy sufficient political support. In particular, sufficient mutual trust must exist 
between the Member States on the one hand, and between the Member States and the EU 
institutions on the other, to allow the EU to develop a degree of independent agency, which in 
turn would increase its effectiveness on the international stage.125  
The pluralist predicament is not desirable and, at least in the context of foreign relations, not 
sustainable. It is not necessary to share a Schmittian mind-set to draw this conclusion.126 The 
performance of the EU on the international stage is less than optimal.127 The high number of 
veto points in the EU decision-making process, in particular within a mixed framework, is an 
important explanatory factor for this sub-optimal performance, as the examples referred to in 
the introduction of this paper demonstrate. The ‘Walloon crisis’, for example, illustrates well 
how the EU’s internal decision-making structures undermine its credibility as an international 
actor. Similarly, as Mitchel Orenstein and Daniel Kelemen have recently pointed out: even 
when the EU is able to take decisions, as it did by imposing economic sanctions on Russia 
                                                
124 Opinion 1/78 (‘International Agreement on Natural Rubber’), para. 62: ‘If … the financing is to be by the Member States 
that will imply the participation of those States in the decision-making machinery or, at least, their agreement with regard to 
the arrangements for financing envisaged and consequently their participation in the agreement together with the 
Community. The exclusive competence of the Community could not be envisaged in such a case.’  
125 The ECJ is aware of the importance of mutual trust. See e.g. Opinion 2/13 (‘Draft Accession Agreement of the EU to the 
ECHR’), para. 168: ‘This legal structure is based on the fundamental premiss that each Member State shares with all the 
other Member States, and recognises that they share with it, a set of common values on which the EU is founded, as stated 
in Article 2 TEU. That premiss implies and justifies the existence of mutual trust between the Member States that those 
values will be recognised and, therefore, that the law of the EU that implements them will be respected.’ 
126 For Schmitt, federalism could not be reconciled with his unified, absolute conception of sovereignty. On the role of 
federalism in Schmitt’s thought, see Nicolas Patrici, Looking into Medusa’s Eyes: Carl Schmitt on Federalism,  in THE 
ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO FEDERALISM 297–313 (Lee Ward & Ann Ward eds., 2009).  
127 See e.g. the European Council on Foreign Relations’ 2016 Foreign Policy Scorecard, which ranks the foreign policy 
performance of the EU institutions and the Member States collectively on a number of files (including the EU’s policy 
towards Russia, China, the US) between B+ and C. The analysis focused on a number of criteria, including strategy, impact, 
unity and resources. See EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2016 (2016), 
http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR157_SCORECARD_2016.pdf (last visited Mar 26, 2017). 
 37 
after the latter’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula, for institutional reasons the EU is 
unable to prevent individual Member States from engaging in independent policies.128 The 
alliance between Russia and Hungary is a case in point: even though Prime Minister Orban 
agreed to the sanctions regime, this did not stand in the way of him inviting Russian President 
Putin on a state visit to Budapest, and to conclude an agreement with Russia to finance a 
nuclear power plant.129  
The pluralist predicament is not only undesirable as a matter of policy effectiveness; it also 
undermines the legitimacy of the EU in the eyes of the European citizenry. This is the case, as 
the language of EU constitutionalism at work in the case law of the ECJ raises certain 
expectations of unity and effectiveness; in particular, it paints a picture of an EU capable of 
acting in a unified manner on the international stage. The mismatch between this ‘integrative 
institutionalist’ or ‘constitutional’ language on the one hand, and institutional practice on the 
other, in which Member States retain control over the EU decision-making process, shatters 
these expectations.130 As Peter Lindseth recently argued in more general terms, but the 
argument arguably extends to the foreign relations context: it unmasks EU constitutionalism 
as a form of ‘as if’ constitutionalism. He held: ‘National institutions are increasingly 
constrained in the exercise of their own constitutional authority but supranational institutions 
are unable to fill the void because Europeans refuse to endow them with the sine qua non of 
genuine constitutionalism: the autonomous capacity to mobilise fiscal and human resources in 
a compulsory fashion.’131  
Lindseth concluded his argument on a normative note by arguing that an awareness of the ‘as 
if’ character of EU constitutionalism should lead us to understand EU law in administrative, 
as opposed to constitutional terms. In Lindseth’s view, EU law should, as the German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht has suggested in its Maastricht and Lissabon case law, should give 
up its claims to supremacy over the legal orders of the Member States. Applied to the context 
of foreign relations, this approach would require the ECJ to abandon the integrative 
                                                
128 Orenstein and Kelemen, supra note 120 at 88. 
129 Marton Dunai, Hungary tests EU nerves frayed by Russia as Putin visits Budapest, REUTERS, February 1, 2017, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-hungary-idUSKBN15G4XW (last visited Apr 9, 2017). 
130 This gap between expectations and capabilities has famously been theorized in the early 1990s by Christopher Hill. See 
his The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role, 31 JCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON 
MARKET STUDIES 305–328 (1993). 
131 Peter L. Lindseth, The Perils of “As If” European Constitutionalism, 22 EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL 696–718, 696 (2016). 
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institutionalist perspective, and interpret the EU’s competences more narrowly, thereby fully 
embracing the practice of mixity.  
This is one avenue to move forward. The alternative, of course, is the Habermasian avenue: 
through processes of deliberation, a European demos could gradually come into being.132 As 
mutual trust gradually increases, and as Member State governments become more committed 
to making EU foreign policy work, the ECJ’s broad reading of the EU’s competences could 
perhaps garner more support amongst the Member States. This process is, however, a gradual 
one, which requires sustained political action at both the EU and Member State levels of 
government. At the Member State level, Europeans must hold their representatives in the 
Council accountable, and urge them to act in accordance with the common EU interest. At the 
EU level, political action is required to open up the Council ‘black box.’ For only through 
increased transparency will meaningful accountability become a possibility.133 These 
strategies will only be effective in the medium- to long term, however. In the short term, it 
would appear that Europe will remain stuck in its pluralist predicament, caught between a 
desire to integrate further and a persistent resistance against doing so.  
 
 
                                                
132 For the theoretical underpinnings of this process of establishing a European demos through the interaction between 
empirical and normative realities (facts and norms), see generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (1998). For an application to the EU context, see Jürgen 
Habermas, Democracy in Europe: Why the Development of the EU into a Transnational Democracy Is Necessary and How 
It Is Possible, 21 EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL 546–557 (2015). 
133 For this reason, the work done by scholars such as Deirdre Curtin or Vigjilenca Abazi is important. See e.g. Deirdre 
Curtin, Official secrets and the negotiation of international agreements: Is the EU executive unbound?, 50 COMMON 
MARKET LAW REVIEW 423–457 (2013); Vigjilenca Abazi & Maarten Hillebrandt, The legal limits to confidential 
negotiations: Recent case law developments in Council transparency: Access Info Europe and In’t Veld, V. Abazi and M. 
Hillebrandt, 52 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 825–845 (2015). 
